More on Israeli Settlements

(Map of the West Bank in June 2011 from B'tselem)

Further to the recent posts on the (il)legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, (shown above in the latest map from B'tselem) and the threat of a US veto of a Palestinian UN membership application, I was interested in looking more closely at what current US policy is on the issue of Israeli settlements.  Israel, remember, claims that settlements themselves are legal as the Fourth Geneva Convention doesn't apply in the Occupied Territories, though it accepts that there are some settlements that are illegal under Israeli domestic law, e.g. Migron. This analysis is wrong as a matter of international law, as the Geneva Conventions have customary - and therefore binding - status on all States, a fact underscored by UNSCR 827 in 1993, itself binding on all UN Members as it was adopted under Chapter VII.


In particular, I was curious about whether US policy was as lock-step behind the current Israeli Likud administration on the question of legality? It is certainly true that America's detractors and opponents would like the rest of the world to believe that the Obama Administration is in the pocket of the Likudniks, and that therefore the US was fundamentally flawed as an interlocutor in the Middle East.

(To their detractors, puppet and puppeteer. If true, which is which?)

Digging through the record, it's clear that this isn't the case, despite the visuals. 

As long ago as 1979, the UN Security Council has held that Israeli settlements constructed on land captured by Israel in 1967 are illegal through the passage of Resolution 446 on 22 March 79. UNSCR 446 was adopted 12-0-3, with Norway, UK and USA abstaining - meaning that the US allowed passage.

On 18 Feb this year, the UNSC sat for its' 6484th meeting, and considered a draft UNSCR which was proposed by 100 states in the UNGA*. The draft UNSCR's Operational Paragraphs stated:

1. Reaffirms that the Israeli settlements established in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace;

2. Reiterates its demand that Israel, the occupying Power, immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard;

3. Calls upon both parties to act on the basis of international law and their previous agreements and obligations, including under the Roadmap, aimed, inter alia, at improving the situation on the ground, building confidence and creating the conditions necessary for promoting the peace process;

4. Calls upon all parties to continue, in the interest of the promotion of peace and security, with their negotiations on the final status issues in the Middle East peace process according to its agreed terms of reference and within the time frame specified by the Quartet in its statement of 21 September 2010;

5. Urges in this regard the intensification of international and regional diplomatic efforts to support and invigorate the peace process towards the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

For the UN, this is strong stuff; and it was duly defeated by a US veto, 14-1-0.

So far, so normal for the US's critics who assert that the US is simply a nebbish covering up for Israel's illegal excesses.

(The estimable US UN Ambassador Dr. Susan Rice).

After each Security Council vote, the UNSC members may choose to speak explaining what just happened. These speeches are known, (with a stunning lack of diplomatic originality) as "Explanation of Vote", or EOVs. Here's what Ambassador Rice had to say after the US vetoed the draft in the face of unanimity on the rest of the Security Council and against the wishes of 100 UN member states:

"The United States has been deeply committed to pursuing a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. In that context, we have been focused on taking steps that advance the goal of two States living side by side in peace and security, rather than complicating that goal. That includes a commitment to work in good faith with all parties to underscore our opposition to continued settlements.

Our opposition to the resolution before this Council today should therefore not be misunderstood to mean we support settlement activity. On the contrary, we reject in the strongest terms the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity. For more than four decades Israeli settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 has undermined Israel’s security and corroded hopes for peace and stability in the region. Continued settlement activity violates Israel’s international commitments, devastates trust between the parties and threatens the prospects for peace.
 

The United States and our fellow Council members are also in full agreement about the urgent need to resolve the conflict between the Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of the two-State solution and an agreement that establishes a viable, independent and contiguous State of Palestine once and for all. We have invested a tremendous amount of effort and resources in pursuit of that shared goal, and we will continue to do so. But the only way to reach that common goal is through direct negotiations between the parties, with the active and sustained support of the United State and the international community. It is the Israelis’ and Palestinians’ conflict, and even the best-intentioned outsiders cannot resolve it for them."

The language is direct, and strikingly similar to that used by President Obama in threatening a veto on the Palestinian application for UN membership: if nothing else, the US was being entirely consistent. It is also heartening to hear that the US "reject[s] in the strongest terms the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity", by which I presume were are suppose to understand that the US considers them illegal under international law, though they don't actually want to say so.

What is missing, of course, is successful economic or political pressure from the US to force the Israelis to freeze the settlements as a prelude to negotiations. But that is a political, not a legal matter. 

(*For the record, the co-sponsors of the draft Resolution were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Somalia, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.) 

Can we supply arms to the Libyan rebels?

(FGM-148 Javelin: designed to be squaddie-proof, and it is therefore probably rebel-proof.)

So the back-and-forth along the Libyan coast is continuing, and though it is encouraging that the long-serving Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa appears to have defected, it doesn't yet feel like either side is going to have a gentle stroll to victory. 

Which is why the American and British Governments are now openly discussing options for supplying the Libyan rebels despite the arms embargo. Is this legal? Secretary of State Clinton and the UK Government says yes it is. Philippe Sands QC says no it isn't. Despite my nuanced disagreement with Prof. Sands earlier this week, I'm instinctively behind him rather than the Governments.

Who's right?

 (Utterly gratuitous shot of UN Headquarters, New York. Cool though.)

The first UN Security Council Resolution is UNSCR 1970 (2011) of Feb 26, 2011. UNSCR 1970 establishes the arms embargo in Operative Paragraphs 9 - 14. Paragraph 9 states:

"9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories"

It goes on to provide some exceptions to the embargo.

This raises two questions. 

First, when UNSCR 1970 talks about banning weapons shipments to the "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", does this mean Libya as a whole or just the Gaddafi regime? 

Second, does UNSCR 1973 (2011) generally supersede UNSCR 1970 (2011), and specifically, does the "all means necessary" language in OP4 of UNSCR 1973 mean that the arms embargo on the rebels is moot in any event? 

On the question of whether the phrase "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" covers both sides in the conflict, I think that for two reasons it must. First, "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" is the official name for Libya, and not that of the Gaddafi Government. More importantly, arms embargoes are typically against both sides - see, for example, the Cote d'Ivoire arms embargo in paragraph 16(c) of UNSCR 1933 (2010) - to avoid overtly taking sides. So on the first count, I think that the arms embargo must apply to both rebels and Gaddafi.  

(UNSCR 1441 adopted unanimously, Nov 8, 2002. Implied repeal meant a bad day for the hawks.)

On the second more substantive question, the doctrine of implied repeal does apply to UNSCRs: if the Security Council grants and then limits or rescinds powers - e.g. for the use of force - then States cannot rely on the earlier Resolution to do what they want. Indeed, just ask Messers Blair and Bush - this was the fundamental problem with their attempt to use UNSCRs from 1990 to legitimate their illegal 2003 attack on Iraq.

But even implied repeal only gets you so far: despite the wide latitude of UNSCR 1973 accorded to intervening States, OP4 states:

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"

So it directly references the arms embargo - reading, in effect;

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding the arms embargo, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya." 

This could be read as rendering the arms embargo moot if the "necessary measures" to protect civilians included the supply of arms to the rebels - or indeed, if the rebels turned nasty, to the Gaddafi forces. 

But I'm not sure. I'm yet to read the Explanation of Votes (EOVs) that accompanied UNSCR 1973 which will provide the critical colour on whether or not the Member States actually thought that they'd granted these powers to the allied coalition - the shape of which was of course unknown. 

I don't know what the definitive legal answer is: it's possible to make a case either way. 

But by far the best approach would be for the allied powers to return to the Security Council to formally vote on raising the arms embargo on the Libyan rebels. The question of whether this would survive a Russian or Chinese veto is separate, but it would in my view be a mistake to press the outer boundaries of the existing resolution out of fear of a veto by Russia or China. Faced with a choice of making them publicly defend casting a veto in favour of Gaddafi's forces, or running around like naughty school boys who know that they're stretching the rules to breaking point, let's go back to the UN and do it properly.

Libyan Targeting

(On top of Norfolk's only hill, a Tornado GR4 armed with Storm Shadow stirs.)

I'm not involved in the targeting for the on-going operations in Libya. But all of the evidence is that those who are taking the care that I would expect, especially when it comes to so-called "collateral damage". Indeed, I was thrilled when I heard this morning that the RAF aborted a pair of Tornados when there were concerns that there were civilians in the area. It might be 1,500 miles from home, but if you're not certain, then you take the bombs 1,500 miles home again - and this is exactly what I would expect from the US forces, France and the other allies involved.

Bravo. Genuinely excellent - BZ to the crews.

But there are a three issues I wanted to deal with tonight. First, what is collateral damage? Second can we target Gaddafi personally? Third, what happens next? 

Is this legal?

Collateral Damage

It is said that the truth is the first casualty in war. This may be true, but personally, there are two other things that annoy me. Firstly, to all of the journalists out there any armoured vehicle with a gun is not necessarily "a tank". (See below). Second, lots of ill-informed nonsense about "collateral damage", ostensibly an Orwellian term for killing innocent civilians. 

So what is "collateral damage"? 

There are four kinds of damage that military action can occasion on a target. Primary Damage, Secondary Damage, Collateral Damage and War Crimes. 

Primary Damage occurs when a legitimate military target is attacked and damaged. Legitimate military targets are defined by Article 52(2) of the 1st Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. Art 52(2) states:

"2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

So the test is two-fold: not only must the target offer an "effective contribution to military action" but if the attack is successful, it must offer a " definite military advantage". I would argue that Art 52(2) is customary international law, and therefore binding on all States.  

"Secondary Damage" is the damage inflicted on a legitimate military target within the ambit of Art 52(2) caused by an attack on something else. So if you attack a weapons dump in a barracks, and the force of the blast destroys some military vehicles, it's "Secondary Damage" and legal.

  

"Collateral Damage" is damage inflicted on a civilian object (or civilian) - in the course of attacking a legitimate target under Art 52(2). So if you're attacking an ammunition dump, and as the bomb goes in, the proverbial "schoolbus full of nuns" drives by, then sadly this is "collateral damage".

The point of discrimination, though, is that if you were to aim at the "schoolbus full of nuns" then you'd be committing a war crime, the fourth type of damage.

 (Not a tank - a BMP-1 Armoured Personnel Carrier)

  

Can we target Gaddafi personally?

An interesting question. 

OP 4 of UNSCR 1973 is explicit in allowing States

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya". 

This must include targeting that is in concert with international law, specifically Art 52(2) of AP 1, above. 

 ("My agent is holding out for Ali-G to play me in the biopic.... these negotiations are like way too stressful.")

So can we "get Gaddafi"? 

Because we don't like him? No. 

Because (to borrow a phrase) he's an "evil doer"? No, that's what the ICC referral was for.

Colonel Gaddafi and his immediate advisors (notably his sons Saif and Khamis) are exercising military command roles, and therefore if they were killed, it is likely to have a "definitive military advantage". As such, provided that they were targeted as part of the command and control apparatus, then I believe that it is legal to do so. 

(Also not a tank - an Italian Oto-Melara Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzer. Do keep up at the back.)

What happens next?

It's unclear. The appearance of - please note - French airpower appears to have saved Benghazi from a Gaddafi armoured column on Saturday afternoon, and the continuing attacks on the Gaddafi forces' equipment will be having an effect. But not only does UNSCR 1973 explicitly ban occupying troops, the free Libyan forces bravery is not matched by training and organisation. So expecting them to be able to take on the regular Libyan forces under Saif Gaddafi and Khamis Gaddafi is asking a lot, even with air superiority and close air support. 

(Tornado GR4 with dual-mode Brimstone)

But this picture released by the British RAF is interesting. It shows an RAF Tornado GR4 carrying dual-mode (laser and radar) guided Brimstone missiles - a UK development of the American Hellfire system, designed to kill Russian tanks near the Fulda Gap. Brimstone can be used in an autonomous mode, and is designed to kill ex-Soviet tanks. If - and this is a big if - the UK wanted to do so, it could, under UNSCR 1973, use this to attack Gaddafi armoured forces anywhere in Libya, and specifically in Tripoli. If the regime loses the ability to control Tripoli, then it will collapse much faster. 

(A tank! Finally! In this case, a former Soviet T-55.)

The surprising Mr. Hague

(The surprisingly radical Mr. Hague. Good.)

It’s tempting (and inevitably risky) to give into hyperbole when commentating on current international events – let alone on the concomitant international legal developments: this particular road to perdition is long, wide and well trodden. But in looking at yesterday’s UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973 (2011)), I feel a little hyperbole may for once be justified. In fact, there’s every chance that the world changed more than a little bit for the better with the passage of UNSCR 1973.

(Hopefully that’s enough hyperbole for everyone.)

Some background. 

In the words of an American lawyer friend of mine, international law simply doesn’t exist. “Where does it come from? Who enforces it?”, she asks.  Despite her cynicism, International law has several sources. First and foremost, it is created by Treaties – in other words obligations freely assumed by States – by decisions of international judicial bodies, by the UN Security Council operating as a legislature by passing binding Security Council Resolutions, arguably by UN GA Resolutions – e.g. the famous 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, and occasionally through eminent legal scholarship. But the most interesting route of international legal development is through the developments of customary international law.

Of these, customary international law is both the most interesting and most difficult because it is based on State Practice – and as it develops, it becomes binding on all States whether they’ve explicitly adopted it or not if it is accepted by enough States. (This is how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – widely accepted as customary international law –applies to Saudi Arabia which explicitly rejected the UDHR in 1948.) Custom is challenging because by its nature it is continuously evolving, and because it can bind States without their consent.

The crucial developmental nexus for customary international law occurs when a State acts in a certain manner because it believes that it is legally obliged to do so even though this legal obligation doesn’t exist in Treaty Law, a UNSCR, or an international judgement. This is known as opino juris. And it is in this that the Libyan crisis has been so important in humanitarian intervention, especially in the developing Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague’s commentary to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FASC) earlier this week was fascinating. Hague explained that his legal advice allowed for a humanitarian exception to Art 2(4) and Art 2(7) in cases of systematic and sustained human rights abuses without explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council. 

 (Sir Daniel Bethlemhem QC. Thank-you very much.)

I’ve don’t recall this argument being advanced by any major power since R2P was outlined in the Conclusions to the 2005 UN World Summit. This is a major step forward – and I salute Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC, the UK Foreign Office Legal Advisor and his team, for taking this courageous but legally accurate and responsible position. Better, this position seems to be shared with France, and (extrapolating wildly) I suspect that this Anglo-Franco position that a further UNSCR was not required would have had a salutary effect on the Council as a whole - and Russia and China in particular. Though both abstained, neither had an interest in allowing R2P outside of the Council's auspices to get too far out of hand (lest it be used against their interests). The result has been that the UN Security Council has mandated the extraordinarily intrusive UNSCR 1973.

UNSCR 1973 is a remarkable document. It starts by defenestrating the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime in Operative Paragraph 2 (OP2) noting the Security Council:

“Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people”

Other than calls for the end of apartheid in South Africa and denunciation of Ian Smith’s rebel regime in Rhodesia from the 1960s onwards, this is remarkably un-UN language: it explicitly states that a UN Member Sate Government (which, remember, was until recently on the UN Human Rights Council in a grotesque parody of that body’s stated mission) is not responding to the Libyan people’s legitimate demands.

Given that the UN’s position on non-intervention in the affairs of Sovereign States is enshrined in Art 2(7) and one that has been a shibboleth for oppressive regimes worldwide, this is quite remarkable. I’d like to think that the Burmese and Zimbabwean UN Missions understood the implications for their own authoritarian regimes, and wrote telegrams to explain this new and (potentially uncomfortable) point for them. 

OP4 is the meat of UNSCR 1973, authorising

“… Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General …”

This reflects the bias in the 2005 R2P language of the desirability of a leading role for the responsible regional grouping – in the case of Libya, both the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference have endorsed a No Fly Zone (NFZ).  But crucially, UNSCR 1973 goes much further authorising Member States:

“… to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …”

This is not an NFZ, which I argued last week would be a reasonably pointless gesture, as it could see allied aircraft pointlessly burning holes in the sky, impotently watching Gaddafi’s forces’ massacre of the opposition. (Which, after all, is roughly what the good Colonel and his son Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi* have promised to do.)

Instead, UNSCR 1973 explicitly foresees the use of airpower and naval gunfire to protect civilians wherever they are in Libya. Taken at face value, this implies support to the Libyan rebels in attacking and defeating Gaddafi’s forces wherever they are in Libya, and with it the Gaddafi regime. 

 (Look, all I wanted to do was order a pizza. Is that too much to ask?)

Indeed, a narrow black-letter reading could even be used to justify limited foreign ground troops, provided that any foreign ground troops were not a “foreign occupation force of any form”. In other words, theoretically at least, the legality of deploying ground troops is about the intention and duration of their deployment, rather than an absolute bar against foreign troops at all. And this flexibility could be very useful, by, for example facilitating the deployment of liaison staff to the anti-Gaddafi forces – or even the deployment of Forward Air Controllers** to coordinate strike operations. 

In other words UNSCR 1973 is a massive step forward for R2P, giving a coalition of the willing in concert with regional groupings broad authority to protect civilians and to attack a repressive regime to do so. It should also leave the world’s remaining repressive autocracies with another early incentive to commence dialogue with whatever civil society groups they’ve failed to stamp out. One suspects that UNSCR 1973 is one precedent that they’ll be keen to forget in a hurry. Somehow I rather doubt that UNSCR 1973  will slide into obscurity so soon.

(Another F3 shot. Good!)

What is needed now is for the immediate implementation of UNSCR 1973 to save Benghazi and Tobruk, and then roll back the Gaddafi regime’s power. I only wish I was still involved*** to be able to play a small role in implementing one of the greatest humanitarian interventions in the postwar period – done successfully this will in time be seen in the same bracket as Kosovo, DR Kampuchea and East Pakistan.

And unlike these three, it will be explicitly legal.

*As an LSE graduate, I do hope that the School can find a route to strip Saif al-Islam of his LSE PhD. If he cheated, as is alleged, then so much the better.

** Or Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) or Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACs) or whatever the most recent Newspeak is for Forward Air Controllers.

*** As the sign outside 111(F) Sqn Hardened Aircraft Shelters at RAF Leuchars said words to this effect (for the next few weeks) “This Squadron is held at very high readiness to project fighter power worldwide. Are you ready?” Yes! F3s from Luqa, Malta fighting for Libyan liberty would be a fitting finale for the flick-knife of death. Salve, F3.