More on Bin Laden's Death

(Another critique)

"Tobbes, it's the right answer for the wrong legal reasoning."

Story of my life.

I'm just travelling, but my critiquer's view is that yesterday's article reflects the US legal approach, and that there is a better approach based around bin Laden as an "unprivileged belligerent". But the problem that we run into revolves around the legal status of non-state actors in non-international armed conflicts.

I'll post more when I've had a chance to have a chat and a think.

Was killing Osama bin Laden legal?

(Osama bin Laden, now the subject of more conspiracy theories than Elvis.)

I write this after a delightful evening discussing this subject with some students at Bennington College, to whom and in particular to Professor Eileen Scully, I'm very grateful - it was good fun. Before we start, I should stress that this post considers only whether the US action in killing Osama bin Laden (OBL*) was legal, and not whether or not it was a good idea from a policy perspective.

To do this, we need to break the question into two elements: 

Question 1: Was it legal to kill bin Laden at all? 

Question 2: If so, was it legal to kill him in Pakistan?

Q1: Was OBL a Combatant?
The first consideration that must be satisified is whether OBL was a combatant in an armed conflict, in order to invoke the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Without this nexus of conflict, the targeted killing of OBL would be illegal - murder.

(An armed attack. RIP.)

Fortunately, determining that OBL was involved in a conflict of some sort after his 1996 Declaration of War on the United States, and that 9/11 attacks is reasonably straightforward, though the kind of armed conflict is open to debate. LOAC recognises two categories of conflict, each with different definitions of combatants: International Armed Conflicts governed by the 1st Additional Protocol  to the Geneva Conventions (AP I, 1977), and Non-International Armed Conflicts governed by the 2nd Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP II, 1977). 

Combatant Status under AP I - International Armed Conflict

War between States represents the classical form, preferably with armies of two or more competing sides fighting pitched battles, usually resulting in clear winners and losers. Under the formulation, both sides began the war holding territory, and from the 18th Century onwards, armies generally wore uniforms and had a clearly discernible chain of command. Wars of this sort still take place, of course - the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a good approximation of the classical case, in which one force overwhelms and occupies another country, and imposes direct rule for a period. In this sense, it would've looked familiar to European diplomats negotiating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 

Who is a combatant in these interstate conflicts? Simply, anyone who is not in the military as defined in Article 43 of AP I. And if you're not a combatant you must initially at least be treated as a civilian, and would therefore be immune from direct attack. But being a combatant is a privileged status itself - it means that you're entitled to PoW Status, something explicitly denied to spies (AP I, Article 46) and mercenaries (AP I, Article 47).

The major attraction for lawyers is that combatants who are not prisoners, shipwrecked or otherwise hors d'combat are always specifically targetable. Any attack must meet the test of distinction, military advantage and proportionality, but this is true of all attacks: the important point is that in an international armed conflict the status of the combatant is constant for long periods of time.

Combatant Status under AP II - Non-International Armed Conflict

By contrast, the (much shorter) AP II is specific for those internal conflicts that rise above the minima of 

"internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence" 

described in Art 1(2) of AP II. AP II recognises that in many civil wars and rebellions, the rebels are frequently part-time combatants, and therefore AP II details in Art 13(3) that 

"Civilians shall enjoy th[is] protection ... unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."

In other words, in the limiting case, the point at which a guerilla puts down her weapon, she loses combatant status and reverts to civilian status. In doing so, she cannot be targeted and therefore cannot be legally killed. 

(An interesting book. One for a future commentary.) 

As a result, determining what constitutes direct participation in hostilities (DPH) is critical, and has resulted in a significant ICRC study published in 2009. (This study is not without controversy, but Art. 13(3) is clear enough for our purposes.)

Was OBL a combatant? Did he take a direct participant in hosilities?
It's clear that depending on the extent which OBL was involved in command and control (C2) and AQ fundraising (presumably determined by intelligence) one could make a case for that though he appears to have been holed in his Abbottabad Compound, he was involved in directing, funding and inciting attacks on western targets. Indeed, assuming that the courier network wasn't there exclusively to collect take-out pizzas, it is pretty likely that OBL had a direct role in hostilities.

If proved, this role would confirm OBL's status as a combatant in AP I, and for the period in which he was undertaking these activities, a combatant under AP II. As a result, I assess that given sufficient evidence, it could reasonably conclude that OBL was a combatant, and that irrespective of your characterisation of the type of conflict, OBL could be a legitimate target.

Naturally, once OBL became a legitimate target, any attack on him would need to meet the normal criteria of discrimination of civilians, military advantage and proportionality before it could be considered legal. And the reports that President Obama elected to send in ground forces in a much riskier attack rather than simply bombing the compound strongly suggests to me that these criteria were being very carefully weighed in the US decision-making process, and that the US elected to expose their forces to greater risk to ensure that the attack itself was proportionate, precise and legal. Good for them.

(Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir, Harrumpher-in-Chief.)

Q2: Was it legal to kill OBL in Pakistan?
With Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir, his diplomats and security leaders harrumphing that killing OBL in Pakistan 'violated Pakistani sovereignty' and was by implication illegal, it is important to assess these claims.

The first point is that there is no doubt that Pakistan's sovereignty was violated by US forces; they flew in in the middle of the night, didn't stop to have their passports stamped, engaged in a 40 minute firefight, killed a number of people, collected (ie, stole) a large amount of documents and electronic equipment, jumped into their helicopters (again, without having their passports stamped leaving Pakistan) and flew away into the night back to Afghanistan. This is a pretty major violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

But sovereignty is not absolute.

Pakistan has an obligation - in common with all other States - to ensure that its' territory is not used by non-State actors for the planning and commissioning of illegal activities, including terrorism. If it does not, there are two effects: first, under Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the State takes legal responsibility for these actions, and second, the State that is threatened can invoke the doctrine of "Self-Help" to remove the threat IF ALL OTHER AVENUES HAVE FAILED.**

Given that the Government of Pakistan in general - and elements of the Pakistani public sector, notably the military and the ISI spy agency in particular - have had a "complex" relationship with salafist jihadis since the 1980s (ranging from sponsorship, funding and training to full-blown conflict against them depending on the time, place and level of threat to Pakistan), it would be unsurprising if the US were to conclude that Pakistan was either unwilling or unable to confront OBL in his Abbottabad compound. Worse, given that the Pakistani security network was either incompetent or colluding with OBL, the US could not have had any confidence that simply providing a name and address would result in a successful Pakistani arrest operation. Consequently, the temporary violation of Pakistani sovereignty, whilst non-trival, was in my view justified, and that therefore the attack was legal as legitimate self-help.

Overall, then, on the narrow question of whether OBL was a legitimate target I would argue that he probably was, and that the manner in which the US conducted the operation in Pakistan was also legal.

*Yes, I know the other transliteration is Usama and therefore UBL. I prefer Osama and OBL, and it's my blog. Points? Questions? I thank you.

**Ang, this is for you. We can argue about self-help later.

Sorry for the interuption to our programming....

I'm sorry for my absence from the blog last month - work work was a little crazy. I'll get something together on "Was killing Osama Bin Laden legal?" by the weekend.

Toby

Can we supply arms to the Libyan rebels?

(FGM-148 Javelin: designed to be squaddie-proof, and it is therefore probably rebel-proof.)

So the back-and-forth along the Libyan coast is continuing, and though it is encouraging that the long-serving Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa appears to have defected, it doesn't yet feel like either side is going to have a gentle stroll to victory. 

Which is why the American and British Governments are now openly discussing options for supplying the Libyan rebels despite the arms embargo. Is this legal? Secretary of State Clinton and the UK Government says yes it is. Philippe Sands QC says no it isn't. Despite my nuanced disagreement with Prof. Sands earlier this week, I'm instinctively behind him rather than the Governments.

Who's right?

 (Utterly gratuitous shot of UN Headquarters, New York. Cool though.)

The first UN Security Council Resolution is UNSCR 1970 (2011) of Feb 26, 2011. UNSCR 1970 establishes the arms embargo in Operative Paragraphs 9 - 14. Paragraph 9 states:

"9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories"

It goes on to provide some exceptions to the embargo.

This raises two questions. 

First, when UNSCR 1970 talks about banning weapons shipments to the "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", does this mean Libya as a whole or just the Gaddafi regime? 

Second, does UNSCR 1973 (2011) generally supersede UNSCR 1970 (2011), and specifically, does the "all means necessary" language in OP4 of UNSCR 1973 mean that the arms embargo on the rebels is moot in any event? 

On the question of whether the phrase "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" covers both sides in the conflict, I think that for two reasons it must. First, "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" is the official name for Libya, and not that of the Gaddafi Government. More importantly, arms embargoes are typically against both sides - see, for example, the Cote d'Ivoire arms embargo in paragraph 16(c) of UNSCR 1933 (2010) - to avoid overtly taking sides. So on the first count, I think that the arms embargo must apply to both rebels and Gaddafi.  

(UNSCR 1441 adopted unanimously, Nov 8, 2002. Implied repeal meant a bad day for the hawks.)

On the second more substantive question, the doctrine of implied repeal does apply to UNSCRs: if the Security Council grants and then limits or rescinds powers - e.g. for the use of force - then States cannot rely on the earlier Resolution to do what they want. Indeed, just ask Messers Blair and Bush - this was the fundamental problem with their attempt to use UNSCRs from 1990 to legitimate their illegal 2003 attack on Iraq.

But even implied repeal only gets you so far: despite the wide latitude of UNSCR 1973 accorded to intervening States, OP4 states:

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"

So it directly references the arms embargo - reading, in effect;

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding the arms embargo, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya." 

This could be read as rendering the arms embargo moot if the "necessary measures" to protect civilians included the supply of arms to the rebels - or indeed, if the rebels turned nasty, to the Gaddafi forces. 

But I'm not sure. I'm yet to read the Explanation of Votes (EOVs) that accompanied UNSCR 1973 which will provide the critical colour on whether or not the Member States actually thought that they'd granted these powers to the allied coalition - the shape of which was of course unknown. 

I don't know what the definitive legal answer is: it's possible to make a case either way. 

But by far the best approach would be for the allied powers to return to the Security Council to formally vote on raising the arms embargo on the Libyan rebels. The question of whether this would survive a Russian or Chinese veto is separate, but it would in my view be a mistake to press the outer boundaries of the existing resolution out of fear of a veto by Russia or China. Faced with a choice of making them publicly defend casting a veto in favour of Gaddafi's forces, or running around like naughty school boys who know that they're stretching the rules to breaking point, let's go back to the UN and do it properly.

Legality of pre-emption is back....

(Prof. Philippe Sands QC: brilliant, but in this case, I respectfully (and uncomfortably) disagree. A bit.)

Legality of pre-emption is back - and as usual, no-one can agree. The Guardian's coverage is pretty sensible, and I'll come to the substance of the argument over whether allied air forces in Libya can continue to attack Gadaffi's ground forces within the terms of UNSCR 1973 in a minute.

But first can we just cherish the fact that we're having this debate at all? The notion that abstruse debates about the legality of the use of force are now taking place in the press at all is wonderful, and a testament to the work of people like Professor Sands, Professor Francoise Hampson, Professor Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, and Professor Charles Garraway in making the role of the law in the use of force so politically important. Thank-you all - it is a wonderful step forward.

Right: Pre-Emption.

There is a long-running argument amongst international lawyers over whether or not you can act pre-emptively in self-defence. In practice, most of the argument over pre-emptive action (more properly, "anticipatory self-defence") comes down to a ferocious debate over which side of a fence are you on: does a State have to absorb the enemy's first strike, or can it blunt it by attacking a State that is in the final stages of launching an attack?

(1967 Pre-emption, Israeli style: Egyptian AF transports destroyed.)

The classic case is the 1967 Six Day War, in which the Israeli Defence Force mounted a pre-emptive attack on Egypt, believing that Egyptian President Nasser having evicted the UN Emergency Force from Sinai and having closed the Straits of Tiran was about to invade Israel. This led to decisive Israeli victories against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with Israel occupying the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Militarily, it was magnificent performance, but legally it was a shambles: the evidence today is that Nasser didn't intend to attack at all, but was posturing for domestic support.

Oops.

Which is why I put myself in the camp that says you have to in effect ride the first punch before counter-attacking (and this could just be the first artillery rounds crossing the border). And those lawyers who favour the right to pre-empt are almost exclusively in the camp that recognises the danger that a broad power of pre-emption would grant - namely, that the greater the margin of appreciation given to those using their right to "anticipatory self defence", the more likely you are to provide a charter for the unbridled use of force.

(Oh dear.)

This is where the Bush Administration's US National Security Strategy of 2002 and 2006 went so far off the rails: it articulated a doctrine of "pre-emptive warfare". At one level, this takes anticipatory self-defence to the logical conclusion: if something could become a threat, it'll be quicker and easier to deal with it now, rather than later.

This is probably true, but it somewhat misses the point that the use of force in such a situation was rendered completely illegal by the passage of Art 2(4) of the UN Charter. In other words, the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 were in fact premised on the Bush Administration's willingness to explicitly break international law.

 (One opposed to more billboards.)

Libyan So What?

Prof. Sands' point that pre-emption is a slippery slope is absolutely correct. But I take issue with this quote in the Guardian:

"It is difficult in international law to argue for a pre-emptive use of force to protect civilians from a possible threat that might arise in the future. We don't know if there is evidence to show that a failure to attack Ghadaffi's forces would lead to a regrouping that would lead in turn to attacks on civilians."

I would suggest that to the contrary there is 42 years' worth of evidence that Gaddafi's forces have led a more (and generally rather less than) benign reign of terror over his country. This to me leads me to an expansive understanding of the powers conferred to the coalition of the willing by the UN, and with it, the conclusion that Gaddafi forces are being used to oppress civilians, and therefore that attacking them at a time and place of the allied air forces' choosing probably meets the requirements of UNSCR 1973 OP4. As such, my disagreement with Prof. Sands is about nuance, not the law specifically.

But Prof. Sands broader point must be right: if not yet, then pretty soon the western air forces are going to be testing the outer boundaries of UNSCR 1973. Accepting as I do, Malcolm Shaw QC's point that these boundaries are elastic, they are not infinitely so. So whilst hoping that the Gaddafi regime collapses before we're faced with the problem of exceeding the powers granted, the correct thing if rebel ground forces cannot overthrow the Gaddafi regime alone, is to return to the UN Security Council for increased powers if that is required. I'll look at how and what these powers would look like in a future post.