And no, it's not about to crash. Not one of mine, but taken at Aviemore in Scotland with one of RAF Leuchars' crews doing what the F3 does best - low and fast.
Toby
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Gratuitous Seasonal Picture of a Tornado F3
And no, it's not about to crash. Not one of mine, but taken at Aviemore in Scotland with one of RAF Leuchars' crews doing what the F3 does best - low and fast.
Toby
Future Imperfect
This post is dedicated to Jay and Carlos who've prompted it in an FB discussion* last night.
So, for whom or what is it "Future Imperfect"?
Probably many things, but in this little column I want to look at the existing borders the world's nation states. In essence, when and how should a region be allowed to secede from a country - and crucially, what qualifies as the "regions" that are allowed to secede? And yes, this has been prompted by yesterday being the sesquicentennial of South Carolina Legislature's attempt to secede that would lead in April 1861 to the first shots of the US Civil War being fired at Fort Sumter. But the modern relevance is underscored by the ICJ's decision on whether Kosovo had the legal capacity to declare independence, and on the Jan 9th, 2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan, and the on-going refusal of the international community to recognise Somaliland.
First the "Why?"
Though not exclusively an African problem, the right of secession is especially stark in Africa, given the wholly arbitrary borders drawn by European states in the 19th Century "scramble for Africa". Whether or not borders were drawn specifically to divide existing indigenous political units, it is clear that existing ethnic and religious divisions were irrelevant to modern Europeans divvying up the "Dark Continent"; after all, competing colonial claims had a dangerous habit of threatening to start wars in Europe which was tiresome (and expensive). But the key point is that the permanence and inviolability of lines on maps is a curiously modern - and western - notion.
What was interesting was the post-colonial settlement in Africa: everyone agreed that whatever else they did, States would never reopen the questions of borders because once one border was up for negotiation on ethnic, historical or any other lines then the whole edifice would crash down, with the result that the continent would descend into chaos. And broadly, that's what happened through to the end of the Cold War; there are obvious exceptions - e.g. Siad Barre's Somalia's invasion and then proxy war with Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia in the Ogaden, but largely elites focussed on promoting a nationalism within their borders and in some sense creating a supra-national identity loyal to the newly independent state. Indeed, it can be argued that it was the failure of this project to replace existing ethnic and religious loyalties with the new nationalism that has resulted in social cleavages lines that have been exploited to such negative ends in Africa since 1960.
That having been said, my inclinations are that if a territory wants to secede, shows this through an internationally supervised free and fair expression of the will of the territory's people, is not under military occupation, agrees to respect the rights of minorities, and abide by the rules of the club that is the international community, then the default setting should be to allow it. This is higher bar than it looks: it means no irredentist claims, no puppet states and no racist regimes. And it demands that those in whom sovereignty is vested - the people - are the ones making the decision.
Why is this a good idea? Partly because it allows a safety relief valve for unhappy minorities to escape a political construct that doesn't work for them; again, based on the popular sovereignty argument, this is about the rights of the individual writ large. Second, stemming from the first, is that this is in the long a measure for stability rather chaos, as the record of peaceful development in unhappy countries is not great.
However, the challenge lies in the "Who"?
In his treatise on the subject, Professor James Crawford SC talks about "self-determination units", or SDUs (note to Middkids: not a far-flung dining hall with dubious pizza).
What constitutes one of these mystic SDUs? It is clear that States within Federations do - Singapore's 1965 independence attests to this - and State practice has extended this to formerly Federal entities - e.g. Kosovo. Under this basis, Somaliland should be recognised. The fact that Somaliland isn't appears to be largely due to African Union (AU) reluctance / refusal / terror at the notion of fiddling with existing African boundaries should resisted at all costs - the classic bureaucratic "floodgates" argument (ie, it may be right in this case, but if we do it here, we open the floodgates to having to do it elsewhere).
It is also invidious to force a territory to remain under the rule of a government which has allowed - or indeed facilitated - acts of oppression or genocide against a minority. Under this criteria, Darfur could not be forced to remain under Sudanese rule if it elected to go its own way under the rules outlined above.
But it these examples are all based on territorial constructs. What would happen if a government oppressed a national minority that was evenly spread, rather than one which had a clearly defined "homeland" that could be spun off? In other words, how does this help Jews, Communists and Christians in Nazi Germany?
The short answer is that it doesn't, and can't. It would be madness to incentivise the creation of ethnic laagers in order to allow them to declare independence; the communal blood-letting of the 1947 Partition of India which cost roughly 500,000 lives as 15 million people moved to be in the "right" country is an instructive lesson in what to avoid.
Hence, secession is in my view a last resort, and one which emphasises the importance of human rights law in protecting minorities within existing states. This is where the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Genocide Convention and UN Convention on the Rights of Child (UNCRC) come into their own - the requirement on governments to treat their populations humanely.
The good news is that once the "Who" is sorted out, the "How" is comparatively straightforward: internationally supervised referenda, an internationally-brokered panel to oversee the process, in particular in managing the technical aspects of this sort of divorce - power grids, water supplies, citizenship, and an international presence to support the new state and report on the rights of minorities.
Not perfect, but designing and implementing an international mechanism to allow for States to peacefully divorce is every bit as important as a tool for letting them go bust.
Thoughts most welcome!
Toby
* I've no idea whether this works or not, but here it is - http://www.facebook.com/notes/jay-robison/thoughts-on-the-decline-of-empire-and-the-neo-secessionists/471840697700?notif_t=note_reply
So, for whom or what is it "Future Imperfect"?
Probably many things, but in this little column I want to look at the existing borders the world's nation states. In essence, when and how should a region be allowed to secede from a country - and crucially, what qualifies as the "regions" that are allowed to secede? And yes, this has been prompted by yesterday being the sesquicentennial of South Carolina Legislature's attempt to secede that would lead in April 1861 to the first shots of the US Civil War being fired at Fort Sumter. But the modern relevance is underscored by the ICJ's decision on whether Kosovo had the legal capacity to declare independence, and on the Jan 9th, 2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan, and the on-going refusal of the international community to recognise Somaliland.
First the "Why?"
Though not exclusively an African problem, the right of secession is especially stark in Africa, given the wholly arbitrary borders drawn by European states in the 19th Century "scramble for Africa". Whether or not borders were drawn specifically to divide existing indigenous political units, it is clear that existing ethnic and religious divisions were irrelevant to modern Europeans divvying up the "Dark Continent"; after all, competing colonial claims had a dangerous habit of threatening to start wars in Europe which was tiresome (and expensive). But the key point is that the permanence and inviolability of lines on maps is a curiously modern - and western - notion.
What was interesting was the post-colonial settlement in Africa: everyone agreed that whatever else they did, States would never reopen the questions of borders because once one border was up for negotiation on ethnic, historical or any other lines then the whole edifice would crash down, with the result that the continent would descend into chaos. And broadly, that's what happened through to the end of the Cold War; there are obvious exceptions - e.g. Siad Barre's Somalia's invasion and then proxy war with Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia in the Ogaden, but largely elites focussed on promoting a nationalism within their borders and in some sense creating a supra-national identity loyal to the newly independent state. Indeed, it can be argued that it was the failure of this project to replace existing ethnic and religious loyalties with the new nationalism that has resulted in social cleavages lines that have been exploited to such negative ends in Africa since 1960.
That having been said, my inclinations are that if a territory wants to secede, shows this through an internationally supervised free and fair expression of the will of the territory's people, is not under military occupation, agrees to respect the rights of minorities, and abide by the rules of the club that is the international community, then the default setting should be to allow it. This is higher bar than it looks: it means no irredentist claims, no puppet states and no racist regimes. And it demands that those in whom sovereignty is vested - the people - are the ones making the decision.
Why is this a good idea? Partly because it allows a safety relief valve for unhappy minorities to escape a political construct that doesn't work for them; again, based on the popular sovereignty argument, this is about the rights of the individual writ large. Second, stemming from the first, is that this is in the long a measure for stability rather chaos, as the record of peaceful development in unhappy countries is not great.
However, the challenge lies in the "Who"?
In his treatise on the subject, Professor James Crawford SC talks about "self-determination units", or SDUs (note to Middkids: not a far-flung dining hall with dubious pizza).
What constitutes one of these mystic SDUs? It is clear that States within Federations do - Singapore's 1965 independence attests to this - and State practice has extended this to formerly Federal entities - e.g. Kosovo. Under this basis, Somaliland should be recognised. The fact that Somaliland isn't appears to be largely due to African Union (AU) reluctance / refusal / terror at the notion of fiddling with existing African boundaries should resisted at all costs - the classic bureaucratic "floodgates" argument (ie, it may be right in this case, but if we do it here, we open the floodgates to having to do it elsewhere).
It is also invidious to force a territory to remain under the rule of a government which has allowed - or indeed facilitated - acts of oppression or genocide against a minority. Under this criteria, Darfur could not be forced to remain under Sudanese rule if it elected to go its own way under the rules outlined above.
But it these examples are all based on territorial constructs. What would happen if a government oppressed a national minority that was evenly spread, rather than one which had a clearly defined "homeland" that could be spun off? In other words, how does this help Jews, Communists and Christians in Nazi Germany?
The short answer is that it doesn't, and can't. It would be madness to incentivise the creation of ethnic laagers in order to allow them to declare independence; the communal blood-letting of the 1947 Partition of India which cost roughly 500,000 lives as 15 million people moved to be in the "right" country is an instructive lesson in what to avoid.
Hence, secession is in my view a last resort, and one which emphasises the importance of human rights law in protecting minorities within existing states. This is where the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Genocide Convention and UN Convention on the Rights of Child (UNCRC) come into their own - the requirement on governments to treat their populations humanely.
The good news is that once the "Who" is sorted out, the "How" is comparatively straightforward: internationally supervised referenda, an internationally-brokered panel to oversee the process, in particular in managing the technical aspects of this sort of divorce - power grids, water supplies, citizenship, and an international presence to support the new state and report on the rights of minorities.
Not perfect, but designing and implementing an international mechanism to allow for States to peacefully divorce is every bit as important as a tool for letting them go bust.
Thoughts most welcome!
Toby
* I've no idea whether this works or not, but here it is - http://www.facebook.com/notes/jay-robison/thoughts-on-the-decline-of-empire-and-the-neo-secessionists/471840697700?notif_t=note_reply
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Public Interest and Wikileaks
Completely irresponsible.
It's not often that I use words as definitive as this; but amongst the tittle-tattle of the Wikileaks material, some of which is undeniably interesting, I was appalled that Wikileaks decided that it was a good idea to release the list of crucial infrastructure worldwide.
Or, in other words, a list of things it would be really bad for the United States - and by extension the rest of the West - if they got attacked.
In an era where the pre-eminent security challenge is posed by salafist jihadis with a persecution complex and a fetish for ritualised "martyrdom", the release of this material has no basis in the public interest or anything else. It is simply irresponsible and shows both a complete disregard for the West's collective interest, and for many of these installations, of public safety.
I say again: completely irresponsible.
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Poetry
Doggerel, actually. Meant to post this earlier on the failure of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review:
Implementing SDR 1998
Geoffrey had a little Plan, with contradictions that weren’t hidden
And anything that Gordon said, Geoffrey did unbidden;
“The Plan” demanded tanks and tankers, breaking Gordon’s “Golden Rule”
But “The Plan” was very popular in Preston, ’ull and Poole.
So Geoffrey stretched “The Plan” out, with “jam tomorrow” for all
And everyone was satisfied, waiting patiently for The Ball.
But then the budget, it collapsed, imperilling “The Plan”
And all that Comrade Bob could do was blame another man…
Sad but true. Time will tell whether the 2010 version is any better - it doesn't look too hopeful.
Implementing SDR 1998
Geoffrey had a little Plan, with contradictions that weren’t hidden
And anything that Gordon said, Geoffrey did unbidden;
“The Plan” demanded tanks and tankers, breaking Gordon’s “Golden Rule”
But “The Plan” was very popular in Preston, ’ull and Poole.
So Geoffrey stretched “The Plan” out, with “jam tomorrow” for all
And everyone was satisfied, waiting patiently for The Ball.
But then the budget, it collapsed, imperilling “The Plan”
And all that Comrade Bob could do was blame another man…
Sad but true. Time will tell whether the 2010 version is any better - it doesn't look too hopeful.
Why is the UK's SDSR like the Ground Zero Mosque?
(Artist's impression of Park 51)
Leaks amuse me.
Especially ones which reinforce my (sometimes strongly) held views about things. (And no, dear readers, not prejudices - analytical views!). And I have a stinking cold, slept all day and so can't sleep, hence blogging on this now.
So, over to our friends at the Daily Telegraph (I know, I know - rightwing claptrap etc etc):
Quelle surprise: Tom McKane's review team have written (and someone helpfully leaked) a mea culpa that conveniently blames the nascent UK NSC for the daft decisions, the rushed timelines and the no-briefing rules. All presumably correct and all entirely predictable, especially as this "Review" took as it's intellectual starting point the previous Secretary of State's (Rt Hon Robert "Comrade Bob" Ainsworth) "effort" at a Green Paper in January could politely be described as "anti-intellectual facile bullshit".
But this underscores the reason I've not blogged on the UK's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) - it's not strategic, and it's not a policy driven defence and security review; instead, it's a cash cuts lead review which has fundamentally unbalanced the UK's military capabilities, with far too strong a focus on big toys and not enough thought on what the UK is trying to achieve.
Specifics: Binning Nimrod MRA 4 and the UK's fixed wing anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft to save £200m p.a. at a time of increased hostile submarine operations and without credible search and rescue alternatives is abysmal, and will cost lives. Ignore the £3.5bn already spent - such sunk costs are sunk - it is a capability that the UK needed and which will be sorely missed, especially as the number of frigates and destroyers (FF/DD) are reduced (again).....
FF/DDs to 19 hulls. Which means that approximately 12-14 can expect to be ready for use at most times, and which compares poorly with the 32 that were required as a minimum in 1998's SDR. Has the RN's tasking fallen by more than a third since '98? Hardly, though their presence on the world's oceans has. But these cuts allowed the Aircraft Carrier programme to proceed......
Ah yes, the Carrier programme.... c. £6bn for two ships, one of which will almost certainly never operate British fixed-wing aircraft as the Harriers are being scrapped (a good choice in a poor document), and the other of which may operate F-35C JSFs from 2020 (another good choice if the money is ever there). But neither of these behemoths will (even if shared with the French) actually be of any use if they can't be protected, and the assets required to protect them (FF/DD, Airborne Early Warning aircraft, Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Attack Submarines) have all had their numbers cut, in some cases to zero. Oops.
And then there's UK's nuclear pretensions with Trident. A subject for another post.
So, why is the UK's SDSR like the Ground Zero Mosque? Because like that project, it's neither Strategic, nor about defence and security. Unlike Park 51 (aka the Ground Zero Mosque - which let's remember, is neither at Ground Zero nor is it a mosque), SDSR is a bad idea, and constitutes a massive missed opportunity for the UK, which will take a decade or more to work through.
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