Showing posts with label Blair. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Blair. Show all posts

Friday, August 30, 2013

A Minor Constitutional Earthquake



In constitutional terms, Tony Blair could be described as the gift that keeps on giving. Having failed with the alternative vote and reform of the House of Lords, last night’s seminal vote on Syria means that David Cameron and Nick Clegg have enacted a major constitutional reform, albeit probably not as they intended. On behalf of the current and future members of the Executive branch, they’ve relinquished the power to engage in wars of choice.
This is remarkable.
Since Walpole was Prime Minister to George I at the dawn of the modern British State, the settlement of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of Government have waxed and waned depending on their comparative strength and the national and international situation. Since 1721, however, one set of Royal Prerogative powers has remained firmly in the hands of the Executive: the power to go to war.
Yet absent an immediate threat to the UK, our overseas territories or to our allies covered by mutual defence treaties (notably NATO Article 5), it is now hard to conceive of circumstances under which a British Prime Minister would order British forces to battle without the explicit prior consent of the House of Commons. Indeed, to do so today would appear to risk a constitutional crisis. Better, for international law, there appears to be a new norm to publish the legal advice on the use of force, and a need for express legality from the United Nations or through the emerging Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
This matters.
For a nation with an unwritten constitution, precedence and practice – combined with some national and international statutes – provide the rules of the political game. If the Executive cedes power to the Legislature or to the devolved administrations, it is unlikely to get it back – and never more than in this case.
How did we get here? The 18 March 2003 vote on the invasion of Iraq was the first time that the Government allowed the Commons to decide whether or not the UK would go to war. In the 2003 vote, the Labour Government majority was provided by the support of the Conservative opposition; the invasion began the following day. And if 2003 provided the opening for the change, then last night’s debate provided the dénouement: when the House of Commons voted against action, Britain was unable to follow the course that the Government of the day was apparently set on.
So despite the warm words of David Cameron in opposition and of Gordon Brown in office, it has fallen to the Commons to take what the Executive failed to enact. In doing so, the House of Commons has asserted a much greater crimp on Executive power than the famous US Congress War Powers Act (WPA). Enacted over Nixon’s veto in 1973 the WPA requires the US Executive to notify Congress of the introduction of US armed forces into hostilities or “situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” within 48 hours, and the gives the Executive up to 90 days to secure Congressional support or to terminate the US armed forces involvement. Britain’s new constitutional settlement for wars of choice doesn’t even give Britain’s Executive this flexibility in future.
There will be those who downplay the scale of these changes, noting that Britain's unwritten constitution is inherently flexible, and that the irreducible element is whether a party can command a Commons majority for its budget. This remains true, but the counterfactual to consider is whether David Cameron could survive ignoring Parliament to join a US-led attack on Syria regardless. The fact that this is now politically inconceivable underscores just how much the Constitutional position changed last night; it will be fascinating to see how this develops.
But make no mistake: reports of a constitutional earthquake last night were entirely accurate.

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Labour Does Defence Cuts(ish): Part One

(MoD Men: Robertson (891), Hoon (2034), Reid (364), Browne (882), Hutton (245), Ainsworth(340)*)

Under normal circumstances, political U-turns are mocked by political opponents and denied by the U-turnee. Occasionally, U-turns are emblematic of a new leaf - classically, Labour's repudiation of Clause IV under Blair in 1994 - and last week we saw something unusual; a Labour shadow Minister in favour of spending cuts, and in particular, defence cuts. Step forward, Jim Murphy MP.

I'll deal with the specifics of the proposed Labour cuts in a future post - suffice to say, they are a long way from both a mea culpa for the damage of the unfunded promises of the Labour 1997-2010 years, but they are a start for Labour to make a credible economic policy.

But in reviewing Labour's record, I thought it would be fun to look at how long Labour's Secretaries of State for Defence were actually in office, and compare that with their Tory predecessors under Margaret Thatcher and John Major - ie, back to 1979. The point is that there is such a steep learning curve as a Secretary of State - especially for those with little or no background in defence - that the first six months or so Ministers will be learning as much as doing, with being really effective from about six months in.

So how did they do?

Two things are striking: first, Geoff Hoon's five-and-a-half years in office was remarkably - and abnormally - long. It wasn't a complete triumph, as Hoon presided over the mini Defence Review known as the "New Chapter" to the 1998 SDSR post the terrorist attacks of 9/11 - and then allowed the UK's forces to become completely over-stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst presiding over the disastrous procurement performance that would come to dominate the MoD's budget (and with it, everything else.)

 
Second, once you take Hoon out of the equation, Labour Defence Secretaries  served for an average of 65 weeks - suggesting that they may have had about six months cognizant of the issues to drive the change required. (John Reid is probably the honourable exception as he had a good defence background in opposition, but he was still in post for only a year, meaning that he wasn't about long enough to deliver change.) Worse, as the budgets reached breaking point under Gordon Brown's premiership, he was keeping his Defence Secretaries in place for about half the historical average - as well in Bob Ainsworth having picked a singularly unimpressive Secretary of State. More damningly, as Ainsworth was the only one who was promoted from inside MoD, he should have had the best handle on the Departmental challenges, but he was probably the poorest of the lot.

So what does this mean? Possibly not much, but it does point to the comparative lack of importance and oversight that the two Labour governments gave to ministerial stability after George Robertson got sent off to run NATO. And that lack of consistent leadership from the top bears much of the responsibility for the mess that MoD was in by the 2010 Election.

*Number of days in office.