Showing posts with label Somaliland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somaliland. Show all posts

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Breaking Up is hard to do...

 (International Law doesn't require Neil Sedaka, but why not...)

In 2011 the world's map has changed. A surprising amount, in fact. 2011 saw the emergence of South Sudan onto the world stage, the failure of Palestine to be accepted to UN Membership - though Palestine is now a UNESCO member - and lots of unhappy (but now largely frozen) conflicts rumbling on (e.g. Balochistan, Kurdistan, West Papua, Puntland, Somaliland, Transnistria, Tibet, and East Turkestan, to name but a few). In other words, the international system is anything but static; the problem is that our international legal system makes it quite difficult.

Given that finding a route out of these otherwise intractable conflicts, this constitutes a problem. A major problem, in fact.


(Fwags required. Honestly!)

But, I hear you cry - "Tobbes, so what? This stuff has been going on for years. And?"

And that's fine. There's clearly more to this independence business than designing a flag and starting a pro-independence party, with the option of having a small war (or indeed a large one) to get your people's freedom. But the problems are significant:

     - How does the outside world decide who to back?
     - What is the territory that needs to be "liberated"?
     - What role is there for democracy?
     - Is a simple majority enough?
     - Who gets to vote?
     - What guarantees are in place for the minorities that are likely to remain in any secession?*
     - How are these enforced?
     - Ultimately, What is "Justice"?

The questions go on and on.

Which is good, as ideally I'd like to do some PhD work on this at some point. Thoughts, anyone?

 (But it does work, occasionally.) 

*We're assuming here that mass population movements are no longer being contemplated - Turkey / Greece in 1922/23 and India / Pakistan in 1947 are experiments that don't need repeating.

Monday, July 4, 2011

Happy Birthday, America!


Happy July 4th to all!

But what does US Independence Day have to tell us about conceptions of Statehood? (Strange question to interrupt hot dogs, ice cream and watermelon with, I appreciate, but this is an international law blog.) Oddly, this is a more interesting question than it may at first seem.

So why July 4th? On July 2nd, 1776, the Second Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia voted to approve a Resolution of Independence drafted by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, and was explained in a polemic drafted by John Adams of Massachusetts, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Robert Livingston of New York, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, and Thomas Jefferson of Virginia - the Committee of Five. Signed by John Hancock as President of the Second Continental Congress, this was approved on July 4th, and released on July 5th, and is known as the Dunlap Broadside after the printer John Dunlap and the size of paper he used - though the double entendre of a legal broadside is accurate, too.

(A different kind of broadside - USS Constitution defeats HMS Guerriere in 1812)

So what was the effect of the Declaration of Independence? At one level, it presumably demonstrated that the Continental Congress was serious in its intent to lead a revolution against British rule; but this was already underway - the Battles of Lexington and Concord had occurred in 1775. Moreover, the Revolutionary War would go on (and on, and on) until the final surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown in October 1781 (though this marked what today may be called "the end of major combat operations"), with de jure independence being achieved in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, with ratification instruments exchanged in Paris on May 12, 1784. 

So, July 4th has rivals as "Independence Day". It could be the de facto independence after Cornwallis's defeat on October 19th, or the de jure independence on May 12th. 

 (Charles Cornwallis, a loser despite his immaculate tailoring)

Why does this matter?

At one level, it clearly doesn't: everyone knows that the 4th of July is US Independence Day, with parades, fireworks and family time: and a national holiday certainly isn't going to get moved to May 12th because of this blog post. But at another, it suggests that the US celebrates its' own Statehood from the Declarations of Independence - which presumably means that if a State were to meet the 1933 Montevideo Convention Criteria which enshrines the Declarative Theory's four criteria for statehood into international law, and were to declare independence, then the US would grant recognition. 

For example, this could mean that Somaliland and Palestine would be recognised by the US without further ado, and that Taiwan need only to formally declare independence to achieve US recognition. Clearly this isn't going to happen, not least as it would be far too disruptive. But it's interesting to ponder none the less. 

So, Happy 4th everyone!


Monday, August 2, 2010

Should they be allowed to secede?

Hello,

Firstly, many thanks for the response to the first of these musings; and so I’ll continue to scribble.

One of the great joys about being an international relations geek in London is that it is always possible to get a fix at Chatham House, where you’ll find fellow sufferers from this malign affliction. I was there last Friday night for Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar speaking on Somali Piracy: Alternative Approaches and Solutions. Professor Samatar’s speech was thought provoking and there will be write up on the CH website later this week. If you’re remotely interested in the politics of the Horn of Africa, it’ll be well worth a read.

Accepting the principal thrust of his argument that piracy off the Somali coast is a symptom of a lack of governance rather than something unique to Somalia that leads to acts which the naval lawyers describe as “Piratical Behaviour”, the solutions will be found on land. And in Somalia, this could involve redrawing the post-colonial boundaries in a way that violates a major taboo in African politics.

I should stress at this point that Professor Samatar himself made clear that he opposes secession, even though he is from north-western Somalia / Somaliland, and his point was that allowing Somaliland to secede would result in a precedent that would allow many Ethiopian groups to claim the same right, and would see Ethiopia implode.

I disagree.

I understand why newly-independent African countries accepted the artificial colonial borders, in order to avoid redrawing the entire map based on ethnicity, which, for better or worse, was expected to lead to chaos. The tragic experience of ethnic Germans at the end of WWII and of the population “transfers” at the birth of India / Pakistan, and Turkey / Greece underline the risks posed by basing boundaries on ethno-nationalism.

But are there cases where exceptions to this rule of the inviolability of pre-existing colonial boundaries should be made? I believe that there are, notably where a federal state exists, or where regions with a profoundly different colonial experience were not offered the choice of independent statehood at independence – in other words, things that Professor James Crawford would describe as “self determination units”.

This applies in at least three cases in Africa: Western Sahara, Cameroon and Somaliland, with South Sudan as the agreed outlier resulting from the 2004 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the Naivasha Agreement). Of these, only Southern Sudan is unique (or sui generis in legalese) – Western Sahara was occupied by Morocco and Mauritania after Spain withdrew in 1975, French Cameroun and British Southern Cameroons were consolidated and as the Republic of Cameroon in 1961, and Somaliland which was independent for five days in June 1960 before union with Italian Somaliland as the Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960.

Why does this matter? In my view, it is important to recognise that international law does provide for cessation by States, and the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion underlines this. Indeed, Kosovo, as a non-autonomous province of a federal state at the time of cessation, arguably had less of a claim than Somaliland had in 1960 or today, after withdrawing from Somalia in June 1991.

So the point is that because Somaliland is in a different legal position to, for example, the Oromo region of Ethiopia, it could hold another independence referendum without rendering asunder the post-colonial settlement of not moving lines on a map. And we know from E. Izzard, Esq., quite how important maps and flags are.

Levity aside, it does suggest that the international community could plausibly claim that recognising Somaliland - if that's what the Somalilanders want - does not mean initiating a free-for-all in Africa. Indeed, the longer the policy of no change under any circumstances goes on, the more likely and completely it is to crumble under its own contradictions rather than a pragmatic recognition of the exceptional cases.

Oh, and there's a direct payoff in the Somali piracy problem, too: areas with a functioning government don't have piracy in anything like the same intensity - Somalia under the Union of Islamic Courts showed this during their time in power. So it is predictably unsurprising that Somaliland doesn't feature as a base for pirates off the Somali coast. Recognition means membership of the international system - and in this case, membership helps everyone.