Showing posts with label LOAC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LOAC. Show all posts

Friday, August 30, 2013

A Minor Constitutional Earthquake



In constitutional terms, Tony Blair could be described as the gift that keeps on giving. Having failed with the alternative vote and reform of the House of Lords, last night’s seminal vote on Syria means that David Cameron and Nick Clegg have enacted a major constitutional reform, albeit probably not as they intended. On behalf of the current and future members of the Executive branch, they’ve relinquished the power to engage in wars of choice.
This is remarkable.
Since Walpole was Prime Minister to George I at the dawn of the modern British State, the settlement of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of Government have waxed and waned depending on their comparative strength and the national and international situation. Since 1721, however, one set of Royal Prerogative powers has remained firmly in the hands of the Executive: the power to go to war.
Yet absent an immediate threat to the UK, our overseas territories or to our allies covered by mutual defence treaties (notably NATO Article 5), it is now hard to conceive of circumstances under which a British Prime Minister would order British forces to battle without the explicit prior consent of the House of Commons. Indeed, to do so today would appear to risk a constitutional crisis. Better, for international law, there appears to be a new norm to publish the legal advice on the use of force, and a need for express legality from the United Nations or through the emerging Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
This matters.
For a nation with an unwritten constitution, precedence and practice – combined with some national and international statutes – provide the rules of the political game. If the Executive cedes power to the Legislature or to the devolved administrations, it is unlikely to get it back – and never more than in this case.
How did we get here? The 18 March 2003 vote on the invasion of Iraq was the first time that the Government allowed the Commons to decide whether or not the UK would go to war. In the 2003 vote, the Labour Government majority was provided by the support of the Conservative opposition; the invasion began the following day. And if 2003 provided the opening for the change, then last night’s debate provided the dénouement: when the House of Commons voted against action, Britain was unable to follow the course that the Government of the day was apparently set on.
So despite the warm words of David Cameron in opposition and of Gordon Brown in office, it has fallen to the Commons to take what the Executive failed to enact. In doing so, the House of Commons has asserted a much greater crimp on Executive power than the famous US Congress War Powers Act (WPA). Enacted over Nixon’s veto in 1973 the WPA requires the US Executive to notify Congress of the introduction of US armed forces into hostilities or “situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” within 48 hours, and the gives the Executive up to 90 days to secure Congressional support or to terminate the US armed forces involvement. Britain’s new constitutional settlement for wars of choice doesn’t even give Britain’s Executive this flexibility in future.
There will be those who downplay the scale of these changes, noting that Britain's unwritten constitution is inherently flexible, and that the irreducible element is whether a party can command a Commons majority for its budget. This remains true, but the counterfactual to consider is whether David Cameron could survive ignoring Parliament to join a US-led attack on Syria regardless. The fact that this is now politically inconceivable underscores just how much the Constitutional position changed last night; it will be fascinating to see how this develops.
But make no mistake: reports of a constitutional earthquake last night were entirely accurate.

Friday, October 21, 2011

Three-and-a-half down....

 
(No risk of running out of red paint.....)

Back in January, I put up a tongue-in-cheek post on the Arab world's dictators, taking the chance to laugh at the cults-of-personality that have blighted the governance of the region since decolonisation in the 1950s. All good clean fun, provided that you don't have to live in any of the more-or-less authoritarian states they ran (badly).

I certainly never expected to be recording the final defeat of Gaddaffi's forces in Sirte at the same time as Tunisia is preparing for its first-ever democratic elections - with an astonishing and inspiring 11,000 candidates running for 218 seats - this Sunday. Hence, we are witnessing a zone of democratic opportunity running from Tunisia to Egypt - absolutely excellent news. Moreover, given the UN vote due today, it seems impossible that Ali Abdullah Saleh will be able to revert to running Yemen in the same manner as he has since 1978, bringing the winds of change to Yemen. And Syria? Well, I'd be a seller of shares in Asad Inc., were they publicly traded.

The legal bit
But the process of revolutions matters, and in Libya there was clearly an International Armed Conflict (IAC) between NATO and Gaddaffi's forces, sanctioned by UNSCR 1973, and a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) between the National Transitional Council and the Gaddaffi regime; the ruling law was clearly some flavour of LOAC in places where conflict was actually taking place.

(Gaddaffi's last redoubt)

In the last 24 hours, it has also become clear that Gaddaffi was alive - though injured - at the time of his capture, and that he was subsequently shot dead, apparently in cold blood. Let's be clear - killing Gaddaffi was the execution of a presumptive PoW (presumptive in that Gaddaffi would have had PoW rights until an a GC III Article 5 Tribunal - which doesn't appear to have been held - decided that he did or didn't qualify), which itself is a War Crime contrary to Article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute.

As Elham Saudi of Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL) pointed out on the UK's Channel Four news last night, it would have been much better for him to have faced trial, both from notions of justice and for the victims to have their day in court. What is interesting now is how the new Libyan authorities choose to deal with these important legal issues - as the Rome Statute makes clear, crimes committed by both sides of an armed conflict need addressing.

Saturday, October 15, 2011

USG Opinion on killing Anwar al-Awlaki: Part II


(Admiral Yamamoto's Mitsubishi G4M Betty after crashing in the Bougainville jungle on 18 Apr 43) 

Back at the beginning of this week, we looked at the international legal considerations of the killings of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan in Yemen last month. Glenn Greenwald of Salon.com characterises this as the "assassination of U.S. citizens without due process has now has become a reality"; Jack Goldsmith (an Assistant Attorney-General under Bush 43) instead favourably compares this with the 1943 targeting of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

In my view, both are mistaken because both make unfounded assertions over over what the controlling law is, as we looked in Part I. Addressing Goldsmith first, unless the US has decided that it is involved in an International Armed Conflict (IAC) with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), then the Yamamoto precedent is simply irrelevant, as the controlling law in these cases would be fundamentally different. It's hard to see how the US and AQAP could be engaged in an IAC, given that AQAP does not appear to control territory as a de facto government, nor does it enjoy at least the tacit support of a State in the way that AQ did under the Taliban prior to September 2001. 

Equally, to assert, as Greenwald does, that it is possible to take active participation in a conflict against the United States - and it is clear that al-Awlaki's video sermons incited violence against the United States and its allies - whilst retaining your full Constitutional rights as a citizen is self-evidently ridiculous, as it is the basest attempt to have your cake and eat it.

As there is no evidence suggesting that al-Awlaki was coerced into making these statements, so the correct constitutional parallel here is with 2nd Lieutenant Martin James Monti USAAC. Monti was the most prominent of the tiny number of American citizens opted by their own free volition to fight for Nazi Germany in WWII (an IAC)*. After going AWOL from India, stealing an aircraft in Italy, and then defecting to Nazi forces in northern Italy, Monti appears to have become a fully-fledged SS officer. He conducted propaganda broadcasts for the SS in 1944-45, and there is no suggestion that Monti was not an enemy combatant at this point, and that targeting him at this point would have been legal. This is without prejudice to that fact that Monti could - and indeed was - subsequently tried for treason, serving a jail term from 1948 until paroled in 1960.

The point here is that by choosing to become a combatant in either an IAC or a NIAC, then al-Awlaki could be targeted under international law for as long as he retained combatant status. 

 
(Warner Hemicycle: the graveyard of Prof. Dry's freshman Poli-Sci students who hadn't done their reading...)

But much had been written on the implications under US domestic law, I was uncertain, so I was delighted to have the chance to discuss this with Prof. Murray Dry, who had the misfortune to be my supervisor when I was a Middlebury undergraduate. Prof. Dry, (the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science at Middlebury), is an esteemed US Constitutional scholar, and I fully expected him to lay out an argument that I should've recalled from his classes, (and hadn't). Instead, he accepted the premise that it would be an absurdity to allow those fighting against the United States to have some sort of right to due process - and implicitly, judicial review - in the midst of a war they are fighting against the United States.

But the US Government memo - or the portions leaked to the New York Times - does not help matters, as it seems to confuse the issue as, 

"The legal analysis, in essence, concluded that Mr. Awlaki could be legally killed, if it was not feasible to capture him, because intelligence agencies said he was taking part in the war between the United States and Al Qaeda and posed a significant threat to Americans, as well as because Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling to stop him." 

As discussed in Part I, this conflates the LOAC notions of the combatant-status ("taking part in the war") with the IHRL requirement to detain and try suspects for crimes, allowing the use of lethal force only in the most extreme cases where the suspect posed an immediate threat to the lives of others. This leaked paragraph, if accurate, does neither, and appears to mis-state the law. Of course, the legal advice could be entirely accurate, but we won't know until it is released.
(US Attorney General Eric H. Holder)

Which brings me the to the final point, which is also the primary point: the use of lethal force by a State in law enforcement usually results in some sort of public investigation in the western world; it is a key element of accountability mechanism, and builds trust in the decision-making processes that frequently require action first, and public consultation second. This is clearly different for the use of force under LOAC, but as the proliferation of official and NGO investigation organisations grows, we can see that there is unprecedented pressure to demonstrate that even in wartime, LOAC is consistently observed; but what is consistent is that standards for accountability are ever increasing.

So for the sake of transparency, and to demonstrate the legality of the approach, please publish the legal advice, Mr. Holder. And do so now, not when it has been drip-fed through convenient leaks.


* This was part of a Nazi plan to induce Allied POWs to fight against the Soviets, and it was spectacularly unsuccessful - around 60 British POWs joined the British element of the Waffen-SS, with at least some of the survivors court-martialed at war's end.

Monday, October 10, 2011

USG opinion on killing Anwar al Awlaki: Part I

(Our source of the legal advice. A good, but unsatisfactory, start.)

On Saturday, the NYT published an article on the legal advice that underpinned the US attack in Yemen that killed Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan. Unfortunately, the advice itself is yet to be published, so we can only comment on the NYT's extracts, but this is nonetheless an interesting start. Clearly, the legal advice on so sensitive a topic should be released, even if the intelligence and intelligence methods that are operationally critical cannot be disclosed.

We are told that the Department of Justice (DOJ) advice runs to "roughly 50 pages"; this is not surprising, as it has to address a number of difficult issues in international law - both LOAC and IHRL - and US domestic law as both Awlaki and Khan were US citizens. The first key point on legality is the supremacy of international law over US domestic law in these cases, as irrespective of the US legal position, if an action was illegal under international law, it would be illegal, period. Of course, there could be circumstances under which an action is legal under international law and illegal under US law, in which case US law would govern US government actions; however, the supremacy of international law over (any State's) domestic law means that the converse cannot be true.

"Other assertions about Mr. Awlaki included that he was a leader of the group, which had become a “cobelligerent” with Al Qaeda, and he was pushing it to focus on trying to attack the United States again."

As this blog has rehearsed, the challenge in determining whether or not it is legal to use force against an individual in an international or non-international armed conflict (IAC or NIAC) is down to their combatant status, by ensuring that States do not attack civilians. As the "Basic Rule" in Article 48(1) of the 1st Additional Protocol 1977 (AP I) states concisely for IACs,

"... the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives."

For NIACs, discrimination is found in Article 13 of the 2nd Additional Protocol (AP II). Only if someone has combatant status - defined for IACs in Article 43 of AP I, and by implication in Article 13(3) of AP II for NIACs - can they be attacked. Only once combatant status in an IAC through membership or in a NIAC by Direct Participation in Hostilities is established can a targeting decision move on to the questions of military advantage, proportionality and humanity.

Hence the importance of establishing Mr Awlaki's status as a "cobelligerent" with AQ. However, this raises more questions than it answers, begging the question of what is the belligerent status or otherwise of AQ and the United States - the implication is that AQ is involved in a transnational IAC, but this is unstated.

(Not all law enforcement operations need to look like this....)

But then the NYT report says this:

"The lawyers were also told that capturing him alive among hostile armed allies might not be feasible if and when he were located."

Which is odd, because this is the language of law enforcement and human rights law - that we need to arrest criminals and that the use of lethal force (the most significant violation of UDHR Art 3 and ICCPR Art 6(1) Right to Life imaginable) is only legitimate when killing a suspect is the only way to avoid an imminent threat to the lives of others (eg suicide bombers). So did the US consider Awlaki an IAC or NIAC combatant or not? And if not, on what imminence grounds did it use lethal force?

The NYT again:

"The document’s authors argued that “imminent” risks could include those by an enemy leader who is in the business of attacking the United States whenever possible, even if he is not in the midst of launching an attack at the precise moment he is located."

If true, this is a troublingly expansive notion of imminence. Imminent threat to life in law enforcement practice has been understood to mean armed suicide bombers ready to detonate their bombs, or kidnappers holding a gun to the head of hostages. This is a million miles from someone who is "not in the midst of launching an attack at the precise moment he is located" - which is much more like the definition of an IAC combatant or a NIAC commander who is fulfilling a continuous combat function of an organised armed group, which brings us back to the key question of what type of conflict (if any) does the US believe it was engaged in with Mr. Awlaki?

Releasing the legal advice should answer this question. And only then we can discuss what the implications for US law are of killing US citizens in this manner.

Drone Strikes: A new international norm?

(Jeff Redfern - fired a Hellfire by mistake, became a legend*)

There's much ado about drones / UAVs / RPAs at the moment, especially as Americans are engaged in an interesting debate about whether the US Government killing American citizens without apparent due process, after the killings of Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Kahn in Yemen in late September. Indeed, there's an interesting piece on the leaked legal advice in today's New York Times which I'll come back to in the next couple of days. For background, this Economist piece is good.

The NYT has also published an interesting article on worldwide drone proliferation, which lists the US, the UK and Israel as the three states to date which have used drones for lethal attacks (US in at least in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen; UK in Afghanistan; Israel in Gaza and Lebanon), with many more States interested in acquiring the capability. Indeed, General Atomics Aeronautical (GA-ASI) have a nice website for all you aspiring Jeff Redferns out there...

But what caught my eye was this from Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh who the NYT quoted as: 

"“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks"

An international norm? Interesting, sounds like international law. As a claim, how does it stack up?

(The Peace Palace, home of the ICJ. It's architecturally absurd, but remarkable. Do go!) 

Sources of International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is widely accepted as the authoritative statement of the sources of international law. These are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Which is sufficiently broad to cover just about anything. However, "an international norm" clearly falls within the ambit of Art 38(1)(c), and if there's sufficient State Practice, then hey presto we've created international law.

So it that's the theory, what does this mean in this case?

Probably not much. At least, it shouldn't mean much, as what the US is doing with it's drone strikes should not be random acts of violence against its politico-military opponents, but as permissible and proportional uses of force under LOAC. Indeed, far from being random, legitimate uses of force under LOAC, will, as usual require:

 - a conflict nexus as either International Armed Conflict or Non-International Armed Conflict;
 - military necessity,
 - humanity,
 - proportionality and
 - the ability to distinguish between military targets and civilians.

None of this changes with the use of drones / UAVs / RPAs; the rules are the same as they always were.

(Preventative warfare? Not big, clever or legal.)

What speaks volumes is the second half of Gormley's quote:
"asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks"

I'm not at all certain the Obama Administration has reverted to the notion of preventative warfare that Bush (43) Administration advanced (to near-universal opprobrium) in 2002 and 2006. If Gormley were to show that this was the case, then the US would again be out on their own (and not in a good way). As far the claim that drones allow for the preemptive use of force outside of armed conflict because they are drones, this is risible: drone attacks are governed by the existing legal framework.

Moreover, any suggestion that drone attacks absent a conflict nexus are governed by anything other than International Human Rights Law (IHRL), which demands the use of minimum force at all times, and only allows for the use of lethal force in the exceptional cases of a clear and immediate threat to the lives of others which cannot be stopped in any other way, is also simply wrong. Quite how an IHRL-compliant lethal use of force by a drone could be justified is an interesting mental exercise, but it would have to be a circumstance in which an individual was imminently threatening the lives of others, that there was no alternative to use force, and the drone was the only option. The challenge here is that how would you know that from a drone alone? Hard to see, but the best that can be said is that it can't be excluded that there could be (extreme) circumstances in which IHRL-compliant drone attacks could be legal, but the onus will be on the attacker to demonstrate that such an attack was legal.  

But let's be clear, there is no new law here - drone attacks are more than adequately governed by the existing use of force framework, and notions of "preventative war" were - and remains - illegal. 

* But only in Doonesbury.

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

"Targeted Killings" Legal Considerations: Part One Armed Conflict


 (MQ-9 Reaper: Radio controlled model airplanes were never this much fun in high school.)

“Targeted Killing” is a strange term. On one hand, it is a technocratic phrase used by commentators to describe what is described by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Professor Philip Alston's excellent essay on targeted killings as “kinetic counter-terrorist operations”* – evoking images of robotic planes blowing up terrorists / bad guys / evil doers in precision ("clinical") strikes, or Special Forces kicking in doors at night and "taking down" the aforementioned terrorists / bad guys / evil doers (T/BG/EDs, I suppose).  

On the other hand, “Targeted Killing” is an Orwellian obfuscation of language to camouflage the violent – and sometimes apparently random – deaths of large numbers in zones of conflict worldwide. Thus, Targeted Killings as a term can cover many things, ranging from the legitimate killing of enemy combatants through assassination of opponents to the murder of innocent civilians.

Finally, “Targeted Killing” is curious as a grammatical description – to define some killings as “targeted” immediately implies a differentiation from others that are “untargeted”, and therefore, (presumably) indiscriminate. Indiscriminate attacks run the serious risk of killing or injuring those who are not legitimate targets - which is a war crime. As this blog has covered in the past, under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) the legal use of force is always targeted - so the very notion of a "targeted" - as opposed to an "untargeted" killing is somewhat confusing.

It is also emotive; killing is not a warm fuzzy word, and therefore, arguably the whole term is pejorative - and in the process we run the risk of missing the legal point. Fundamentally, how do "Targeted Killings" differ from any other combatant deaths? 

Let's look at the law.

(Professor Philip Alston, NYU; a good lawyer, who also writes beautifully.)

Conflict Nexus
The most important question is "what is the controlling law?" There are three possible answers:

- LOAC, when there is an International Armed Conflict (IAC), with the IAC rules;

- LOAC, when there is a non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), with the NIAC rules;

- International Human Rights Law (IHRL), where there is no armed conflict (ie, any disturbances / riots are below the level for conflict), based on the 1948 UDHR subsequent international instruments (e.g. the ICCPR, CEDAW) and the regional charters (e.g. ECHR / ACHPR);

The key here is that under LOAC, "targeted killings" against combatants (IAC) or those taking an active part in hostilities (NIAC), are, subject to the proportionality and military advantage rules, legal. Under the peacetime policing rules of IHRL, the test for the use of lethal force is much tougher - is acceptable if it the only way to protect others from an immediate threat. 

Fundamentally, the legal problem under LOAC comes down to combatant status - or not - and with it, identification. If you successfully target and kill a senior enemy combatant, then you may well gain a measurable military advantage - similarly, if you were able to target individuals with specific high-demand skills (e.g. Yahya "The Engineer" Ayyaash, killed by the Israelis in January 1996), then you'll gain a disproportionate military advantage. 

But to achieve these disproportionate results, you need excellent intelligence, a precise understanding of the weapon's explosive effect - which as long ago as 2003 was detailed in the Seattle Times - and a judgement based on the likely number of civilian deaths (Collateral Damage) versus the military advantage to determine legality.

(T/BG/EDs? Pashtun civilians? Stag do? Hollywood extras? How can you tell?)

Role of Intelligence 
This is where things become difficult, in that the information used to conduct the target identification is likely to be highly classified intelligence, which by its' nature is unlikely to be released - and if material is occasionally declassified or leaked, then the manner in which it was collected and analysed will remain unclear, making an external assessment of its veracity difficult. After all, intelligence agencies rightly want to protect their sources and methods, for fear of losing access to a source or method in future.

Within these rules the challenge - as Alston's article details - is to ensure that the legal requirements are met, and that there is an appropriate level of oversight; ironically (in light of the Nicaragua Case) Ronald Reagan's notion of "trust but verify" is ever more important. The problem, of course, is that if the intelligence files are not openly available, then it is difficult or impossible to assess the targeting decision. Moreover, as the enquiries and cynicism predictably coalesce around those strikes that have gone wrong, (either because of a technical, intelligence or judgement error), then the lack of the intelligence basis for the targeting decision makes accurate ex-post assessment of the decision-making virtually impossible: all you'll see is the human - and civilian - toll. 

So "Targeted Killings" - if we must use the term - of combatants in IACs and NIACs are much less legally problematic than some would have us believe. But establishing oversight to ensure that the analytical framework behind these attacks is credible and produces legal strikes is critical - and that's where Professor Alston's essay is so useful.

I'll return to specifics later, along with the IHRL implications.

* Alston, p. 47

Friday, May 6, 2011

Was killing Osama bin Laden legal?

(Osama bin Laden, now the subject of more conspiracy theories than Elvis.)

I write this after a delightful evening discussing this subject with some students at Bennington College, to whom and in particular to Professor Eileen Scully, I'm very grateful - it was good fun. Before we start, I should stress that this post considers only whether the US action in killing Osama bin Laden (OBL*) was legal, and not whether or not it was a good idea from a policy perspective.

To do this, we need to break the question into two elements: 

Question 1: Was it legal to kill bin Laden at all? 

Question 2: If so, was it legal to kill him in Pakistan?

Q1: Was OBL a Combatant?
The first consideration that must be satisified is whether OBL was a combatant in an armed conflict, in order to invoke the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Without this nexus of conflict, the targeted killing of OBL would be illegal - murder.

(An armed attack. RIP.)

Fortunately, determining that OBL was involved in a conflict of some sort after his 1996 Declaration of War on the United States, and that 9/11 attacks is reasonably straightforward, though the kind of armed conflict is open to debate. LOAC recognises two categories of conflict, each with different definitions of combatants: International Armed Conflicts governed by the 1st Additional Protocol  to the Geneva Conventions (AP I, 1977), and Non-International Armed Conflicts governed by the 2nd Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP II, 1977). 

Combatant Status under AP I - International Armed Conflict
War between States represents the classical form, preferably with armies of two or more competing sides fighting pitched battles, usually resulting in clear winners and losers. Under the formulation, both sides began the war holding territory, and from the 18th Century onwards, armies generally wore uniforms and had a clearly discernible chain of command. Wars of this sort still take place, of course - the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a good approximation of the classical case, in which one force overwhelms and occupies another country, and imposes direct rule for a period. In this sense, it would've looked familiar to European diplomats negotiating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 

Who is a combatant in these interstate conflicts? Simply, anyone who is not in the military as defined in Article 43 of AP I. And if you're not a combatant you must initially at least be treated as a civilian, and would therefore be immune from direct attack. But being a combatant is a privileged status itself - it means that you're entitled to PoW Status, something explicitly denied to spies (AP I, Article 46) and mercenaries (AP I, Article 47).

The major attraction for lawyers is that combatants who are not prisoners, shipwrecked or otherwise hors d'combat are always specifically targetable. Any attack must meet the test of distinction, military advantage and proportionality, but this is true of all attacks: the important point is that in an international armed conflict the status of the combatant is constant for long periods of time.

Combatant Status under AP II - Non-International Armed Conflict
By contrast, the (much shorter) AP II is specific for those internal conflicts that rise above the minima of 

"internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence" 

described in Art 1(2) of AP II. AP II recognises that in many civil wars and rebellions, the rebels are frequently part-time combatants, and therefore AP II details in Art 13(3) that 

"Civilians shall enjoy th[is] protection ... unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."

In other words, in the limiting case, the point at which a guerilla puts down her weapon, she loses combatant status and reverts to civilian status. In doing so, she cannot be targeted and therefore cannot be legally killed. 


(An interesting book. One for a future commentary.) 

As a result, determining what constitutes direct participation in hostilities (DPH) is critical, and has resulted in a significant ICRC study published in 2009. (This study is not without controversy, but Art. 13(3) is clear enough for our purposes.)

Was OBL a combatant? Did he take a direct participant in hosilities?
It's clear that depending on the extent which OBL was involved in command and control (C2) and AQ fundraising (presumably determined by intelligence) one could make a case for that though he appears to have been holed in his Abbottabad Compound, he was involved in directing, funding and inciting attacks on western targets. Indeed, assuming that the courier network wasn't there exclusively to collect take-out pizzas, it is pretty likely that OBL had a direct role in hostilities.

If proved, this role would confirm OBL's status as a combatant in AP I, and for the period in which he was undertaking these activities, a combatant under AP II. As a result, I assess that given sufficient evidence, it could reasonably conclude that OBL was a combatant, and that irrespective of your characterisation of the type of conflict, OBL could be a legitimate target.

Naturally, once OBL became a legitimate target, any attack on him would need to meet the normal criteria of discrimination of civilians, military advantage and proportionality before it could be considered legal. And the reports that President Obama elected to send in ground forces in a much riskier attack rather than simply bombing the compound strongly suggests to me that these criteria were being very carefully weighed in the US decision-making process, and that the US elected to expose their forces to greater risk to ensure that the attack itself was proportionate, precise and legal. Good for them.

(Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir, Harrumpher-in-Chief.)

Q2: Was it legal to kill OBL in Pakistan?
With Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir, his diplomats and security leaders harrumphing that killing OBL in Pakistan 'violated Pakistani sovereignty' and was by implication illegal, it is important to assess these claims.

The first point is that there is no doubt that Pakistan's sovereignty was violated by US forces; they flew in in the middle of the night, didn't stop to have their passports stamped, engaged in a 40 minute firefight, killed a number of people, collected (ie, stole) a large amount of documents and electronic equipment, jumped into their helicopters (again, without having their passports stamped leaving Pakistan) and flew away into the night back to Afghanistan. This is a pretty major violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

But sovereignty is not absolute.

Pakistan has an obligation - in common with all other States - to ensure that its' territory is not used by non-State actors for the planning and commissioning of illegal activities, including terrorism. If it does not, there are two effects: first, under Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the State takes legal responsibility for these actions, and second, the State that is threatened can invoke the doctrine of "Self-Help" to remove the threat IF ALL OTHER AVENUES HAVE FAILED.**

Given that the Government of Pakistan in general - and elements of the Pakistani public sector, notably the military and the ISI spy agency in particular - have had a "complex" relationship with salafist jihadis since the 1980s (ranging from sponsorship, funding and training to full-blown conflict against them depending on the time, place and level of threat to Pakistan), it would be unsurprising if the US were to conclude that Pakistan was either unwilling or unable to confront OBL in his Abbottabad compound. Worse, given that the Pakistani security network was either incompetent or colluding with OBL, the US could not have had any confidence that simply providing a name and address would result in a successful Pakistani arrest operation. Consequently, the temporary violation of Pakistani sovereignty, whilst non-trival, was in my view justified, and that therefore the attack was legal as legitimate self-help.

Overall, then, on the narrow question of whether OBL was a legitimate target I would argue that he probably was, and that the manner in which the US conducted the operation in Pakistan was also legal.

*Yes, I know the other transliteration is Usama and therefore UBL. I prefer Osama and OBL, and it's my blog. Points? Questions? I thank you.

**Ang, this is for you. We can argue about self-help later.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Libyan Targeting

(On top of Norfolk's only hill, a Tornado GR4 armed with Storm Shadow stirs.)

I'm not involved in the targeting for the on-going operations in Libya. But all of the evidence is that those who are taking the care that I would expect, especially when it comes to so-called "collateral damage". Indeed, I was thrilled when I heard this morning that the RAF aborted a pair of Tornados when there were concerns that there were civilians in the area. It might be 1,500 miles from home, but if you're not certain, then you take the bombs 1,500 miles home again - and this is exactly what I would expect from the US forces, France and the other allies involved.

Bravo. Genuinely excellent - BZ to the crews.

But there are a three issues I wanted to deal with tonight. First, what is collateral damage? Second can we target Gaddafi personally? Third, what happens next? 

Is this legal?
Collateral Damage
It is said that the truth is the first casualty in war. This may be true, but personally, there are two other things that annoy me. Firstly, to all of the journalists out there any armoured vehicle with a gun is not necessarily "a tank". (See below). Second, lots of ill-informed nonsense about "collateral damage", ostensibly an Orwellian term for killing innocent civilians. 

So what is "collateral damage"? 

There are four kinds of damage that military action can occasion on a target. Primary Damage, Secondary Damage, Collateral Damage and War Crimes. 

Primary Damage occurs when a legitimate military target is attacked and damaged. Legitimate military targets are defined by Article 52(2) of the 1st Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. Art 52(2) states:

"2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

So the test is two-fold: not only must the target offer an "effective contribution to military action" but if the attack is successful, it must offer a " definite military advantage". I would argue that Art 52(2) is customary international law, and therefore binding on all States.  

"Secondary Damage" is the damage inflicted on a legitimate military target within the ambit of Art 52(2) caused by an attack on something else. So if you attack a weapons dump in a barracks, and the force of the blast destroys some military vehicles, it's "Secondary Damage" and legal.
  
"Collateral Damage" is damage inflicted on a civilian object (or civilian) - in the course of attacking a legitimate target under Art 52(2). So if you're attacking an ammunition dump, and as the bomb goes in, the proverbial "schoolbus full of nuns" drives by, then sadly this is "collateral damage".

The point of discrimination, though, is that if you were to aim at the "schoolbus full of nuns" then you'd be committing a war crime, the fourth type of damage.

 (Not a tank - a BMP-1 Armoured Personnel Carrier)
  
Can we target Gaddafi personally?
An interesting question. 

OP 4 of UNSCR 1973 is explicit in allowing States

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya". 

This must include targeting that is in concert with international law, specifically Art 52(2) of AP 1, above. 

 ("My agent is holding out for Ali-G to play me in the biopic.... these negotiations are like way too stressful.")

So can we "get Gaddafi"? 

Because we don't like him? No. 

Because (to borrow a phrase) he's an "evil doer"? No, that's what the ICC referral was for.

Colonel Gaddafi and his immediate advisors (notably his sons Saif and Khamis) are exercising military command roles, and therefore if they were killed, it is likely to have a "definitive military advantage". As such, provided that they were targeted as part of the command and control apparatus, then I believe that it is legal to do so. 

(Also not a tank - an Italian Oto-Melara Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzer. Do keep up at the back.)

What happens next?
It's unclear. The appearance of - please note - French airpower appears to have saved Benghazi from a Gaddafi armoured column on Saturday afternoon, and the continuing attacks on the Gaddafi forces' equipment will be having an effect. But not only does UNSCR 1973 explicitly ban occupying troops, the free Libyan forces bravery is not matched by training and organisation. So expecting them to be able to take on the regular Libyan forces under Saif Gaddafi and Khamis Gaddafi is asking a lot, even with air superiority and close air support. 

(Tornado GR4 with dual-mode Brimstone)

But this picture released by the British RAF is interesting. It shows an RAF Tornado GR4 carrying dual-mode (laser and radar) guided Brimstone missiles - a UK development of the American Hellfire system, designed to kill Russian tanks near the Fulda Gap. Brimstone can be used in an autonomous mode, and is designed to kill ex-Soviet tanks. If - and this is a big if - the UK wanted to do so, it could, under UNSCR 1973, use this to attack Gaddafi armoured forces anywhere in Libya, and specifically in Tripoli. If the regime loses the ability to control Tripoli, then it will collapse much faster. 

(A tank! Finally! In this case, a former Soviet T-55.)

Sunday, March 20, 2011

UK publishes Libya legal advice (sort of)

(Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG addressing the Iraq Enquiry. Thank-you for everything.)

Appearing at the Iraq Enquiry last year, former UK Foreign Office Deputy Legal Adviser Elizabeth Wilmshurst (now Head of the Chatham House International Law Programme) - and the only person to resign over the illegality of the 2003 Iraq invasion - described the 2003 legal and policy process as  ... lamentable. There should have been greater transparency within government about the evolving legal advice" .  

Quite right too. 

So it was with real interest that I saw a note from Nick Clegg to LibDem party members this morning on the Libyan situation which includes this:

"Colonel Gaddafi’s treatment of his own people has been brutal, savage and wholly unacceptable. We have worked with Libya’s regional neighbours, especially the Arab League, and countries across the globe, to secure a resolution in UN Security Council. This resolution will allow us to act lawfully  in deploying our forces to up-hold a ‘no-fly zone’ in Libya.

The Prime Minister gave a statement yesterday, which you can read here. And on Monday we will have a full debate in the House of Commons, followed by a vote. In addition we will be publishing a summary of the legal advice of the Attorney-General. 

That is the right approach. This is a coalition government that will act decisively to protect innocent lives and uphold universal human rights. But one which will do so working with, not against, international law and the international community."

Shortly, therefore, we should get to read a summary of Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC's thoughts. Great, I look forward to it. 

Even better, Nick, you could publish the whole thing, and not just the summary.
   
Update: Here's the UK legal advice. Very sensible.

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

LOAC or IHL? Words matter!

(The ICRC Customary International Law Study - a wonderful piece of work.) 

Rant Mode: ON (You have been warned.)

Words matter. Names matter.

And that is why  is why I'm always so annoyed with the ICRC's insistence on using the term "International Humanitarian Law" (IHL) when referring to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The principal (& principled) problem is that as a term IHL is dangerously close to International Human Rights Law (IHRL), inviting comparison, conflation and breeding confusion. It is true that some eminent commentators - e.g. Professor Philippe Sands QC - have characterised the two bodies of law as twins separated at birth, raised by mutually antagonistic parents. This is fair enough as both legal cannons emanate from a well-spring of humanitarianism, designed to protect people from the arbitrary predations of States and the powerful; but they are distinct.

And distinct for a reason. Human Rights Law is universal and applies at all times; these are, after all, universal minimum guarantees. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enumerates the fundamental rights of people worldwide (even if there were UN members which routinely violated the UDHR's requirements in 1948 - e.g. colonial rule, apartheid, or slavery). Numerous national, regional and international human rights instruments have been added (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979; the African charter on Human and Peoples Rights from 1981) which together with some Courts - notably the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg - have transformed the rights of people worldwide by enunciating them and providing redress (however patchy and imperfect.) This is a proud history and a firm foundation for building a better future.

 (The rather wonderful companion to the red book, above.)

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), however, is of a fundamentally different form. First and most importantly, LOAC can by definition only apply during conflict; simply, it is legal to kill an enemy combatant in wartime when killing the same person in peacetime is called murder. Second, as lex specialis (special law relating to specific circumstances), LOAC replaces the existing law for the period in which it is applicable where the two conflict. Third, specific and different rules apply for International Armed Conflicts (IACs) and Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs). Finally, LOAC has large elements that predate the Treaties and exist under Customary International Law which the ICRC attempted the thankless task of pulling together it the Customary Law Study (the red book at the top of the post) - a good piece of work, being improved with the current update, and is especially rewarding when read in tandem with Chatham House's critique (the blue book). 

(Not a pizza)

Any attempt to merge the two is like comparing an apple with a pizza; they are both about rights, but their form and function is entirely different.

So when the ICRC as the guardians of the central LOAC treaty-based legislation (Geneva Conventions I - IV from 1949 and the two Additional Protocols to the Conventions from 1977) tries to broaden the scope of the Conventions by extending the scope of NIACs down from insurgencies where insurgents hold territory and operate a chain of command to civil unrest and riots*, problems are inevitable. The most obvious is that as lex specialis, applying LOAC to civil unrest would actually reduce the protection of human rights, as LOAC overrides the human rights protections.

(Libya's new-old flag: today's protesters are using a variant of the old Royalist flag from pre-1969)

Applying this notion in situations in Libya today could have the following legal effect: by replacing human rights law with LOAC, instead of treating Libyan protesters as civilians engaged in awe-inspiring demotic civic dialogue, who have, amongst other things, the right to life, liberty and security of person under UDHR Article 3, the civilians could be treated as rebel combatants and legally killed as long as there was a military advantaged gained by doing so. When Col. Gaddafi promises to "die in Libya" then it's reasonable to assume that such a legal position would remove what little restraint still exists on the use of force. As bad as things are in Libya, they could be much, much worse if the survival of the state legally allowed essentially unlimited use of force against protesters.

Thus to suggest that LOAC and IHRL are the same thing is bonkers, as it serves to reduce protections and increase the incentive for oppressive regimes to go for broke. Madness, in my humble opinion.

So, a plea for clarity. LOAC is LOAC because it covers armed conflicts - and IHRL covers peacetime. The names help remind us of this, and makes for better policy.

Rant Mode: OFF

*This is a serious and separate problem. Fortunately, Chatham House are conducting an experts' working group on the Classification of Conflict which I'm looking forward to reading in due course. 

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Armed Attacks in Cyberspace

 (The front door to our wonderful playroom.)

I was at Chatham House last night for Elizabeth Wilmshurst's excellent International Law Discussion Group series, this time addressed by Col. Hays Parks USMC (Retd), the editor of the forthcoming US Department of Defense Manual on the Law of Armed conflict. (Yes, it's finally happening, and we can replace US Army Field Manual FM 27-10 from 1956!) As expected, Col. Parks was excellent, and with a distinguished audience asking pointedly interesting questions, it was heaven for a LOAC* geek! As usual, ILDG was all very interesting, and there will be a formal note of the meeting on the ILDG website shortly.

(An Annex to our wonderful playroom.)

But one of the most interesting elements was the news that there will be a chapter on the law covering electronic attacks and cyberwarfare. This will be the shortest of the chapters, reflecting the novelty of the subject, but it will be fascinating to see the conceptual approach that the US are taking; crucially, what will they say about the definition of an armed attack in cyberspace? All to be revealed shortly, it seems.

* Don't let Wikipedia or the ICRC mislead you, dear reader. LOAC is not "International Humanitarian Law", it is the law to regulate - and make less terrible - armed conflict... hence, the Law Of Armed Conflict - LOAC! Please note: this blog has no strong views on this subject. Too much.