Showing posts with label FCO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FCO. Show all posts

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Can we supply arms to the Libyan rebels?

(FGM-148 Javelin: designed to be squaddie-proof, and it is therefore probably rebel-proof.)

So the back-and-forth along the Libyan coast is continuing, and though it is encouraging that the long-serving Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa appears to have defected, it doesn't yet feel like either side is going to have a gentle stroll to victory. 

Which is why the American and British Governments are now openly discussing options for supplying the Libyan rebels despite the arms embargo. Is this legal? Secretary of State Clinton and the UK Government says yes it is. Philippe Sands QC says no it isn't. Despite my nuanced disagreement with Prof. Sands earlier this week, I'm instinctively behind him rather than the Governments.

Who's right?

 (Utterly gratuitous shot of UN Headquarters, New York. Cool though.)

The first UN Security Council Resolution is UNSCR 1970 (2011) of Feb 26, 2011. UNSCR 1970 establishes the arms embargo in Operative Paragraphs 9 - 14. Paragraph 9 states:

"9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories"

It goes on to provide some exceptions to the embargo.

This raises two questions. 

First, when UNSCR 1970 talks about banning weapons shipments to the "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", does this mean Libya as a whole or just the Gaddafi regime? 

Second, does UNSCR 1973 (2011) generally supersede UNSCR 1970 (2011), and specifically, does the "all means necessary" language in OP4 of UNSCR 1973 mean that the arms embargo on the rebels is moot in any event? 

On the question of whether the phrase "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" covers both sides in the conflict, I think that for two reasons it must. First, "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" is the official name for Libya, and not that of the Gaddafi Government. More importantly, arms embargoes are typically against both sides - see, for example, the Cote d'Ivoire arms embargo in paragraph 16(c) of UNSCR 1933 (2010) - to avoid overtly taking sides. So on the first count, I think that the arms embargo must apply to both rebels and Gaddafi.  

(UNSCR 1441 adopted unanimously, Nov 8, 2002. Implied repeal meant a bad day for the hawks.)

On the second more substantive question, the doctrine of implied repeal does apply to UNSCRs: if the Security Council grants and then limits or rescinds powers - e.g. for the use of force - then States cannot rely on the earlier Resolution to do what they want. Indeed, just ask Messers Blair and Bush - this was the fundamental problem with their attempt to use UNSCRs from 1990 to legitimate their illegal 2003 attack on Iraq.

But even implied repeal only gets you so far: despite the wide latitude of UNSCR 1973 accorded to intervening States, OP4 states:

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"

So it directly references the arms embargo - reading, in effect;

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding the arms embargo, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya." 

This could be read as rendering the arms embargo moot if the "necessary measures" to protect civilians included the supply of arms to the rebels - or indeed, if the rebels turned nasty, to the Gaddafi forces. 

But I'm not sure. I'm yet to read the Explanation of Votes (EOVs) that accompanied UNSCR 1973 which will provide the critical colour on whether or not the Member States actually thought that they'd granted these powers to the allied coalition - the shape of which was of course unknown. 

I don't know what the definitive legal answer is: it's possible to make a case either way. 

But by far the best approach would be for the allied powers to return to the Security Council to formally vote on raising the arms embargo on the Libyan rebels. The question of whether this would survive a Russian or Chinese veto is separate, but it would in my view be a mistake to press the outer boundaries of the existing resolution out of fear of a veto by Russia or China. Faced with a choice of making them publicly defend casting a veto in favour of Gaddafi's forces, or running around like naughty school boys who know that they're stretching the rules to breaking point, let's go back to the UN and do it properly.

Sunday, March 20, 2011

UK publishes Libya legal advice (sort of)

(Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG addressing the Iraq Enquiry. Thank-you for everything.)

Appearing at the Iraq Enquiry last year, former UK Foreign Office Deputy Legal Adviser Elizabeth Wilmshurst (now Head of the Chatham House International Law Programme) - and the only person to resign over the illegality of the 2003 Iraq invasion - described the 2003 legal and policy process as  ... lamentable. There should have been greater transparency within government about the evolving legal advice" .  

Quite right too. 

So it was with real interest that I saw a note from Nick Clegg to LibDem party members this morning on the Libyan situation which includes this:

"Colonel Gaddafi’s treatment of his own people has been brutal, savage and wholly unacceptable. We have worked with Libya’s regional neighbours, especially the Arab League, and countries across the globe, to secure a resolution in UN Security Council. This resolution will allow us to act lawfully  in deploying our forces to up-hold a ‘no-fly zone’ in Libya.

The Prime Minister gave a statement yesterday, which you can read here. And on Monday we will have a full debate in the House of Commons, followed by a vote. In addition we will be publishing a summary of the legal advice of the Attorney-General. 

That is the right approach. This is a coalition government that will act decisively to protect innocent lives and uphold universal human rights. But one which will do so working with, not against, international law and the international community."

Shortly, therefore, we should get to read a summary of Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC's thoughts. Great, I look forward to it. 

Even better, Nick, you could publish the whole thing, and not just the summary.
   
Update: Here's the UK legal advice. Very sensible.

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Strategic Defence and Security Review, Part 1

The UK is undergoing a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) at the moment. What the SDSR should do is provide an analysis of what the UK’s place in the world is, what role the UK aspires to have, and how much the UK is prepared to spend to achieve this. This includes deciding how to spend money between the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the intelligence agencies and, potentially, the Department for International Development (DfID).

Naturally, how much you want to spend is pretty important. Portugal at the end of the Salazar / Caetano dictatorship spent 40% of the total Portuguese budget on the colonial wars in Africa, whereas Germany (1.3% of GDP) and Japan (0.9% of GDP) demonstrate that the level of defence spending is all about political choices. And of course with the 1974 Portuguese Revolution, the wars abroad ended, and defence spending fell quickly. So, in a spirit of titanic modesty, I want to scribble some thoughts on what I would put into SDSR over the next few days.

First up, the UK’s place in the world.

What are the UK’s long-term interests? Foreign policy has been largely bipartisan, and somewhat timeless. It was Lord Palmerston who opined in 1848 that:

‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’

This is good news if it means that this is an area of public policy that is amenable to long-term planning. It would be much healthier if we were politically able to have a cross-party planning process, but even in this era of coalition building, this appears to be a bridge too far. Nonetheless, what do I think are the UK’s long-term interests?

1. It’s the economy, stupid.

Bill Clinton was spot on in the ’92 Presidential Race – if you can’t get the economy moving and provide a credible plan to eliminate the deficit, then it’s all going to end in tears. (See Portugal, above).

Put crudely, the British military is not self-funding – and therefore it relies on a strong economy to pay for it through taxation. And so for the remainder of the UK’s international position – diplomacy, aid, spooks.

What does this mean in concrete terms? For me, it means that a key role of the Foreign Office is to promote British commercial interests abroad – with a key focus being about strengthening the international legal protections for the UK’s service industries as well as promoting physical UK exports. Given that the current rules of the international trade are a largely Anglo-American production, we need to extend enforcement and to ensure that efforts to roll back liberalisation are tackled and defeated. In this, the appointment of Simon Fraser as the professional head of the FCO is timely and welcome, given his background in trade policy - normally a comparatively less important policy area (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=22577659).

What do the military contribute to the economy? Well, the obvious is some £14bn of public spending on “stuff” with private companies. And though the days of Gun Boat Diplomacy are ostensibly over (much to the disappointment of some Naval Service Officers of my acquaintance), the role of UK forces in increasing international stability and ensuring freedom of navigation worldwide is an indirect economic benefit.

But no-one would claim that the military should be used as an economic stimulus – even the UK defence lobby’s study last summer inadvertently showed that stimulus should be spent on construction or biochemistry. Critically, we should dismiss the argument that placing military equipment orders in the UK is a sensible use for economic stimulus as the things you build cannot realistically support the UK economy after they are completed, unlike a new railway or an upgraded trunk road.

2. We are international traders.

The UK’s wealth has come from trade of things, ideas and services. This means that we must be forward and outward looking – isolationism is simply not an option. This means that we must be fully engaged with the EU as our largest market and that we need to engage with the outside world to ensure that UK firms and UK-based taxpayers have the best possible shot at winning business.

3. We are a Status Quo power.
No, not prog rock. The UK has been a player on the international scene since the before the Norman Conquest. It is also party to the world’s oldest alliance Treaty still in effect – the 1386 Treaty of Windsor, which seals the UK’s alliance with Portugal.

With such a history, today’s UK policy planners build on several hundred years’ diplomatic effort to cement the UK’s international influence in good times and to hold onto these gains in barren periods. After all, it could be argued that the British Isles are a rather wet and gloomy group of islands perched precariously off the north west coast of Europe.

And no generation did better than the WWII generation in bequeathing us Permanent Membership of the Security Council, 4.85% of the votes at the IMF and a Director (currently Alex Gibbs), a slew of politico-military posts in NATO, including the Number 2 (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, DSACEUR), and a British Judge on the International Court of Justice (currently Christopher Greenwood).

This is tremendously helpful, as it is disproportionate to the UK’s actual level of international economic and military clout. But it is a double-edged sword given that the UK’s optimal position is to keep the institutional structures legitimate whilst retaining as much UK influence as possible. My thinking is that this means that we need to be seen to be a leading proponent of reform to ensure that we can play a leading role in defining the terms of reform.

The cause celebre is UN Security Council reform that will (at some point) increase the number of Permanent Members to include some of Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and maybe Nigeria or South Africa. In order for the Council to operate effectively, it is as inconceivable that the new Permanent Members would gain vetoes as it would be that the existing Permanent Members would give their vetoes up – which they would have to vote for. Therefore, fear not – the UK will never be forced to give up its Security Council veto.

And so with the institutional and legal structure – it’s strongly in our favour, so we need to defend it by ensuring it’s legitimacy by supporting incremental reform on our terms - and the main route to this is to underpin the existing international legal order.

Conclusions
Public spending will be constrained as the UK undertakes a fiscal repair job over the next five years; the international affairs portfolio will bear cuts along with the rest of Government. But the real challenge will be to focus on the long-term national interest, which is to reinforce the UK’s existing systemic advantages by underpinning the legitimacy of the overall system.

In our next instalment, we’ll look at the numbers.