Showing posts with label R2P. Show all posts
Showing posts with label R2P. Show all posts

Saturday, October 15, 2011

Gareth Evans on R2P: Is Syria next?

(Gareth Evans QC AO)

Back at the beginning of the Libyan revolution, I asked "Am I my brother's keeper" in reference to the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. So it was with some annoyance that I missed the lecture by Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister, and later head of the International Crisis Group at Chatham House's International Law Programme on 6 Oct 11. Evans has been a major proponent of R2P in recent years, and under R2P, the international community undertakes to ensure that the failures of the 1990s in Rwanda, Srebenica and Kosovo are not repeated - a position that made it into Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Conclusions. Para 139 states in part:

"The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."

As this blog has previous pointed out, Para 139 is a real drafting hodgepodge, betraying the lack of unanimity in the international community. Crucially, should R2P - and especially the use of force - be allowed outside the direct consent of the UNSC acting under Chapter VII's Article 42? 
The relationship between R2P and Chapter VII is critical, because at one end of the spectrum, R2P is no more than a rhetorical device, as the UNSC continues to control the use of force, even in time of humanitarian emergencies; if so, it is pointless. At the other end of the scale, R2P could be construed as bolstering (the pre-existing) right of humanitarian intervention outside of the UNSC in cases where the UNSC is unable or unwilling to act.  
(Them again....)

It is therefore with great interest that I read the transcript of Gareth Evans' 6 October speech. What's particularly striking is that Evans repeatedly ties R2P very narrowly to the UNSC rather than an expansive understanding tied to humanitarian intervention, and he then sets out a five criteria test for what he takes great care to describe as 
"... legitimacy - not the criteria of legality, that's clear; Security Council support - criteria of legitimacy"

These criteria are below; though lengthy, I think it is worth quoting Evans' five-fold test in full:

The first test is seriousness of risk. Is the threatened harm of such a kind, such a scale, as to at least prima facie justify the use of military force?
 

The second test is whether the primary purpose of the proposed military action is actually to halt or avert the threat in question, as distinct from being about oil or bananas or whatever. They can be secondary or tertiary considerations and they could be quite relevant in helping to mobilize otherwise sceptical domestic constituencies but the intention test has to be what’s the primary motivation genuinely – is it to help or avert harm?

The third test is last resort. Has every non-military option been, if not applied in practise because that can be possibly time consuming in some cases, but has it at least been explored and found wanting and unlikely to serve the purpose.
 

The fourth test is one of proportionality, of a scale, the duration, the intensity of a proposed military action and the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question.

And the final and often the toughest legitimacy test is balance of consequences. Will those at risk be better or worse off as a result of such military action being taken?
 
(Decent shooting in Bab al Azizya, with photo credit to Elham at LFJL)

In Evans' view the 2011 Libyan intervention met all five criteria, though in his view they may have gone too far in prosecuting the conflict - in that it went further than the abstaining States were probably expecting when they allowed the passage of UNSCR 1973 (it passed 10-0-5, with Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia abstaining), which probably contributed to the Chinese and Russian vetoes of draft UNSCR S/2011/612 of 4 Oct 2011. S/2011/612 was defeated 9-2-4 (China and Russia vetoing, with Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa abstaining); in other words, if China and Russia had abstained, there was the bare minimum of 9 votes required for passage. 

So with the death toll in anti-Assad protests reportedly reaching 3,000, what is the position of R2P after a (very benign) draft UNSCR on Syria was vetoed by the UNSC? (And let's be very clear - the vetoed text is a million miles from authorising the use of force - and had been deliberately watered down to overcome Chinese and Russian objections, which suggests that sponsors were expecting that the concessions would be sufficient get this through, and as a result it isn't likely to do much for P5 relations on the UNSC.) 

I presumed that R2P had to add something to the existing framework, by explicitly recognising a right to intervene when circumstances on the ground demanded it. Simply, without it, R2P is meaningless, and there's no point in having it at all - so why put it in Para 139 of the 2005 World Summit text? It is this element that is so confusing (and potentially disturbing) about Gareth Evans' speech - it is when the UNSC is deadlocked, and crimes are occurring on the ground that the R2P buttress to humanitarian intervention doctrine comes into its' own, and intervention to protect the civilian population should be initiated. 

(Closer to the action than Gioia was to Libya. Beer is better, too.)

This is one that will run and run, but I'd prefer to see the UK and allied aircraft that handed Benghazi's airspace back to Libyan control yesterday moved to RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus to bring a little force to bear on the Syrian regime. Akrotiri is less than 220nm from Damascus - under 25 mins flying time. But for Evans, presumably the no-go from the UNSC would mean that R2P can't be applied - and it is this result with which I have the most trouble.

So, President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy: prove that Gareth Evans is too cautious and give R2P some legs with an NFZ over Syria - it's legal, and it woulg give the Arab Spring the opportunity to bloom in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs as well. 

Monday, March 28, 2011

Legality of pre-emption is back....

(Prof. Philippe Sands QC: brilliant, but in this case, I respectfully (and uncomfortably) disagree. A bit.)

Legality of pre-emption is back - and as usual, no-one can agree. The Guardian's coverage is pretty sensible, and I'll come to the substance of the argument over whether allied air forces in Libya can continue to attack Gadaffi's ground forces within the terms of UNSCR 1973 in a minute.

But first can we just cherish the fact that we're having this debate at all? The notion that abstruse debates about the legality of the use of force are now taking place in the press at all is wonderful, and a testament to the work of people like Professor Sands, Professor Francoise Hampson, Professor Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, and Professor Charles Garraway in making the role of the law in the use of force so politically important. Thank-you all - it is a wonderful step forward.

Right: Pre-Emption.

There is a long-running argument amongst international lawyers over whether or not you can act pre-emptively in self-defence. In practice, most of the argument over pre-emptive action (more properly, "anticipatory self-defence") comes down to a ferocious debate over which side of a fence are you on: does a State have to absorb the enemy's first strike, or can it blunt it by attacking a State that is in the final stages of launching an attack?


(1967 Pre-emption, Israeli style: Egyptian AF transports destroyed.)

The classic case is the 1967 Six Day War, in which the Israeli Defence Force mounted a pre-emptive attack on Egypt, believing that Egyptian President Nasser having evicted the UN Emergency Force from Sinai and having closed the Straits of Tiran was about to invade Israel. This led to decisive Israeli victories against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with Israel occupying the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Militarily, it was magnificent performance, but legally it was a shambles: the evidence today is that Nasser didn't intend to attack at all, but was posturing for domestic support.

Oops.

Which is why I put myself in the camp that says you have to in effect ride the first punch before counter-attacking (and this could just be the first artillery rounds crossing the border). And those lawyers who favour the right to pre-empt are almost exclusively in the camp that recognises the danger that a broad power of pre-emption would grant - namely, that the greater the margin of appreciation given to those using their right to "anticipatory self defence", the more likely you are to provide a charter for the unbridled use of force.

(Oh dear.)

This is where the Bush Administration's US National Security Strategy of 2002 and 2006 went so far off the rails: it articulated a doctrine of "pre-emptive warfare". At one level, this takes anticipatory self-defence to the logical conclusion: if something could become a threat, it'll be quicker and easier to deal with it now, rather than later.

This is probably true, but it somewhat misses the point that the use of force in such a situation was rendered completely illegal by the passage of Art 2(4) of the UN Charter. In other words, the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 were in fact premised on the Bush Administration's willingness to explicitly break international law.

 (One opposed to more billboards.)

Libyan So What?

Prof. Sands' point that pre-emption is a slippery slope is absolutely correct. But I take issue with this quote in the Guardian:

"It is difficult in international law to argue for a pre-emptive use of force to protect civilians from a possible threat that might arise in the future. We don't know if there is evidence to show that a failure to attack Ghadaffi's forces would lead to a regrouping that would lead in turn to attacks on civilians."

I would suggest that to the contrary there is 42 years' worth of evidence that Gaddafi's forces have led a more (and generally rather less than) benign reign of terror over his country. This to me leads me to an expansive understanding of the powers conferred to the coalition of the willing by the UN, and with it, the conclusion that Gaddafi forces are being used to oppress civilians, and therefore that attacking them at a time and place of the allied air forces' choosing probably meets the requirements of UNSCR 1973 OP4. As such, my disagreement with Prof. Sands is about nuance, not the law specifically.

But Prof. Sands broader point must be right: if not yet, then pretty soon the western air forces are going to be testing the outer boundaries of UNSCR 1973. Accepting as I do, Malcolm Shaw QC's point that these boundaries are elastic, they are not infinitely so. So whilst hoping that the Gaddafi regime collapses before we're faced with the problem of exceeding the powers granted, the correct thing if rebel ground forces cannot overthrow the Gaddafi regime alone, is to return to the UN Security Council for increased powers if that is required. I'll look at how and what these powers would look like in a future post.

Libyan Reflections

(Top tip to revolutionaries: make sure your signs are in english for television...)

Well, in Libya at least, it all seems to be going swimmingly: my concerns that air support alone may not be enough to break Gaddafi's forces are yet to be confirmed - and in retaking the oil towns of Brega, Ras Lanuf and Ben Jawad, they've opened the road to Sirte, Gaddafi's home town.

All good news. And though it would be easy to point out that Sirte could mark the point at which it begins to get harder, the point is that thus far, the strategy is working, especially as there are reports that Gaddafi forces are breaking and running from the fight under fire from allied airpower.

But the opposite of optimism may not be pessimism, but a dose of realism. I sincerely hope that the Sirte garrison realise what is good for them, and give it up gracefully - but then that hasn't been the case so far for the Gaddafi forces. As his home town, if Sirte falls then suggestions that it's game over for Gaddafi may prove accurate. But let's hope it goes well - and have a solid plan for what happens if it doesn't - within the rules of UNSCR 1973. 

On a different Libyan issue, I saw the photo below posted on an aviation website earlier today:

(Are you sitting comfortably? I'd want it bolted to the pickup, but that's 'ealth 'n' safety nonsense, mate!)

According to the poster, it shows Gaddafi forces deploying a twin pedastal mounted launcher for the Russian 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 GRINCH) infra-red guided surface to air missile system. I'm not a great MANPADS spotter (too many look too similar!) but it looks right to me. Which, given that Igla-S is the newest and longest-legged former Russian, underscores that the crews over Libya are not operating in a no-threat bubble. Good on 'em, and may they continue to be safe / lucky.


Thursday, March 24, 2011

Army + Air Force = Victory

 
(P-47 Thunderbolt, France, 1944 - the beginning of Air-Land Integration)

I think - and I'm sure that someone will correct me - that it was Gen. Omar Bradley who is credited with coining the phrase "Army plus Air Force* equals Victory" following the breakout from Normandy and the critical battle of Falaise Gap. This became the basis of western land doctrine at all points since then, with increasing success coming from a combination of improved communications and situational awareness, together with much more accurate air-to-ground weaponry. Thus doctrine evolved through the post-Vietnam US "Air Land Battle" doctrine - rolled out to general astonishment in Operation DESERT STORM - through to today's Air Land Integration (ALI) in Afghanistan.

But whilst this is working increasingly well in Afghanistan, it is a real challenge in Libya: fundamentally, can the anti-Gaddafi forces who are poorly equipped, and though unquestionably brave, poorly trained defeat the Libyan Army simply because of allied air power?

It's an open question. The key in ALI is integration - making sure that what you're targeting is not only the opposition, but that the targets you are hitting are being hit in the most efficient order to maximise the impact on the ground. This may mean therefore that you're hitting the tanks that you can see ahead of you on the battlefield - a tactical imperative - but that the most effective could be an attack on supply nodes, particularly on fuel, ammunition - what Colin Powell referred to in his "armchair generals worry about strategy, real generals worry about logistics" epithet in Gulf War I. It was also the basis for the 1944 "Transport Plan" in which the USAAF / RAF heavy bombers were diverted to resupply nodes in France, in order to support the ground troops by starving the German forces of supplies.

(The brilliant horseshoe. When effective, the UNSC remains our best hope for international peace and security.)

This demands a level of abstraction from the target that is harder to square with UNSCR 1973. Harder, but not impossible - OP 4 states that the mission is "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" - in other words, if you can expansively interpret "threat" then a broad scale targeting plan becomes possible.

Ultimately, this broader approach is probably what will be needed if we are to avoid either stalemate in Libya, or worse, a Gaddafi victory. My hunch - and it's no more than this - is that if we can demonstrate to the line Gaddafi army units that they can defect to the rebels and live, or get destroyed in detail by allied air power, then we're several steps forward.

*Yes, I know that in 1944, the US Air Force was still part of the US Army as the US Army Air Corps.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Libyan Targeting

(On top of Norfolk's only hill, a Tornado GR4 armed with Storm Shadow stirs.)

I'm not involved in the targeting for the on-going operations in Libya. But all of the evidence is that those who are taking the care that I would expect, especially when it comes to so-called "collateral damage". Indeed, I was thrilled when I heard this morning that the RAF aborted a pair of Tornados when there were concerns that there were civilians in the area. It might be 1,500 miles from home, but if you're not certain, then you take the bombs 1,500 miles home again - and this is exactly what I would expect from the US forces, France and the other allies involved.

Bravo. Genuinely excellent - BZ to the crews.

But there are a three issues I wanted to deal with tonight. First, what is collateral damage? Second can we target Gaddafi personally? Third, what happens next? 

Is this legal?
Collateral Damage
It is said that the truth is the first casualty in war. This may be true, but personally, there are two other things that annoy me. Firstly, to all of the journalists out there any armoured vehicle with a gun is not necessarily "a tank". (See below). Second, lots of ill-informed nonsense about "collateral damage", ostensibly an Orwellian term for killing innocent civilians. 

So what is "collateral damage"? 

There are four kinds of damage that military action can occasion on a target. Primary Damage, Secondary Damage, Collateral Damage and War Crimes. 

Primary Damage occurs when a legitimate military target is attacked and damaged. Legitimate military targets are defined by Article 52(2) of the 1st Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. Art 52(2) states:

"2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

So the test is two-fold: not only must the target offer an "effective contribution to military action" but if the attack is successful, it must offer a " definite military advantage". I would argue that Art 52(2) is customary international law, and therefore binding on all States.  

"Secondary Damage" is the damage inflicted on a legitimate military target within the ambit of Art 52(2) caused by an attack on something else. So if you attack a weapons dump in a barracks, and the force of the blast destroys some military vehicles, it's "Secondary Damage" and legal.
  
"Collateral Damage" is damage inflicted on a civilian object (or civilian) - in the course of attacking a legitimate target under Art 52(2). So if you're attacking an ammunition dump, and as the bomb goes in, the proverbial "schoolbus full of nuns" drives by, then sadly this is "collateral damage".

The point of discrimination, though, is that if you were to aim at the "schoolbus full of nuns" then you'd be committing a war crime, the fourth type of damage.

 (Not a tank - a BMP-1 Armoured Personnel Carrier)
  
Can we target Gaddafi personally?
An interesting question. 

OP 4 of UNSCR 1973 is explicit in allowing States

"to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya". 

This must include targeting that is in concert with international law, specifically Art 52(2) of AP 1, above. 

 ("My agent is holding out for Ali-G to play me in the biopic.... these negotiations are like way too stressful.")

So can we "get Gaddafi"? 

Because we don't like him? No. 

Because (to borrow a phrase) he's an "evil doer"? No, that's what the ICC referral was for.

Colonel Gaddafi and his immediate advisors (notably his sons Saif and Khamis) are exercising military command roles, and therefore if they were killed, it is likely to have a "definitive military advantage". As such, provided that they were targeted as part of the command and control apparatus, then I believe that it is legal to do so. 

(Also not a tank - an Italian Oto-Melara Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzer. Do keep up at the back.)

What happens next?
It's unclear. The appearance of - please note - French airpower appears to have saved Benghazi from a Gaddafi armoured column on Saturday afternoon, and the continuing attacks on the Gaddafi forces' equipment will be having an effect. But not only does UNSCR 1973 explicitly ban occupying troops, the free Libyan forces bravery is not matched by training and organisation. So expecting them to be able to take on the regular Libyan forces under Saif Gaddafi and Khamis Gaddafi is asking a lot, even with air superiority and close air support. 

(Tornado GR4 with dual-mode Brimstone)

But this picture released by the British RAF is interesting. It shows an RAF Tornado GR4 carrying dual-mode (laser and radar) guided Brimstone missiles - a UK development of the American Hellfire system, designed to kill Russian tanks near the Fulda Gap. Brimstone can be used in an autonomous mode, and is designed to kill ex-Soviet tanks. If - and this is a big if - the UK wanted to do so, it could, under UNSCR 1973, use this to attack Gaddafi armoured forces anywhere in Libya, and specifically in Tripoli. If the regime loses the ability to control Tripoli, then it will collapse much faster. 

(A tank! Finally! In this case, a former Soviet T-55.)

Saturday, March 19, 2011

The surprising Mr. Hague


(The surprisingly radical Mr. Hague. Good.)
It’s tempting (and inevitably risky) to give into hyperbole when commentating on current international events – let alone on the concomitant international legal developments: this particular road to perdition is long, wide and well trodden. But in looking at yesterday’s UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973 (2011)), I feel a little hyperbole may for once be justified. In fact, there’s every chance that the world changed more than a little bit for the better with the passage of UNSCR 1973.
(Hopefully that’s enough hyperbole for everyone.)
Some background. 

In the words of an American lawyer friend of mine, international law simply doesn’t exist. “Where does it come from? Who enforces it?”, she asks.  Despite her cynicism, International law has several sources. First and foremost, it is created by Treaties – in other words obligations freely assumed by States – by decisions of international judicial bodies, by the UN Security Council operating as a legislature by passing binding Security Council Resolutions, arguably by UN GA Resolutions – e.g. the famous 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, and occasionally through eminent legal scholarship. But the most interesting route of international legal development is through the developments of customary international law.
Of these, customary international law is both the most interesting and most difficult because it is based on State Practice – and as it develops, it becomes binding on all States whether they’ve explicitly adopted it or not if it is accepted by enough States. (This is how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – widely accepted as customary international law –applies to Saudi Arabia which explicitly rejected the UDHR in 1948.) Custom is challenging because by its nature it is continuously evolving, and because it can bind States without their consent.

The crucial developmental nexus for customary international law occurs when a State acts in a certain manner because it believes that it is legally obliged to do so even though this legal obligation doesn’t exist in Treaty Law, a UNSCR, or an international judgement. This is known as opino juris. And it is in this that the Libyan crisis has been so important in humanitarian intervention, especially in the developing Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
British Foreign Secretary William Hague’s commentary to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FASC) earlier this week was fascinating. Hague explained that his legal advice allowed for a humanitarian exception to Art 2(4) and Art 2(7) in cases of systematic and sustained human rights abuses without explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council. 

 (Sir Daniel Bethlemhem QC. Thank-you very much.)
I’ve don’t recall this argument being advanced by any major power since R2P was outlined in the Conclusions to the 2005 UN World Summit. This is a major step forward – and I salute Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC, the UK Foreign Office Legal Advisor and his team, for taking this courageous but legally accurate and responsible position. Better, this position seems to be shared with France, and (extrapolating wildly) I suspect that this Anglo-Franco position that a further UNSCR was not required would have had a salutary effect on the Council as a whole - and Russia and China in particular. Though both abstained, neither had an interest in allowing R2P outside of the Council's auspices to get too far out of hand (lest it be used against their interests). The result has been that the UN Security Council has mandated the extraordinarily intrusive UNSCR 1973.
UNSCR 1973 is a remarkable document. It starts by defenestrating the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime in Operative Paragraph 2 (OP2) noting the Security Council:
“Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people”
Other than calls for the end of apartheid in South Africa and denunciation of Ian Smith’s rebel regime in Rhodesia from the 1960s onwards, this is remarkably un-UN language: it explicitly states that a UN Member Sate Government (which, remember, was until recently on the UN Human Rights Council in a grotesque parody of that body’s stated mission) is not responding to the Libyan people’s legitimate demands.
Given that the UN’s position on non-intervention in the affairs of Sovereign States is enshrined in Art 2(7) and one that has been a shibboleth for oppressive regimes worldwide, this is quite remarkable. I’d like to think that the Burmese and Zimbabwean UN Missions understood the implications for their own authoritarian regimes, and wrote telegrams to explain this new and (potentially uncomfortable) point for them. 
OP4 is the meat of UNSCR 1973, authorising
“… Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General …”
This reflects the bias in the 2005 R2P language of the desirability of a leading role for the responsible regional grouping – in the case of Libya, both the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference have endorsed a No Fly Zone (NFZ).  But crucially, UNSCR 1973 goes much further authorising Member States:
“… to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …”
This is not an NFZ, which I argued last week would be a reasonably pointless gesture, as it could see allied aircraft pointlessly burning holes in the sky, impotently watching Gaddafi’s forces’ massacre of the opposition. (Which, after all, is roughly what the good Colonel and his son Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi* have promised to do.)
Instead, UNSCR 1973 explicitly foresees the use of airpower and naval gunfire to protect civilians wherever they are in Libya. Taken at face value, this implies support to the Libyan rebels in attacking and defeating Gaddafi’s forces wherever they are in Libya, and with it the Gaddafi regime. 

 (Look, all I wanted to do was order a pizza. Is that too much to ask?)
Indeed, a narrow black-letter reading could even be used to justify limited foreign ground troops, provided that any foreign ground troops were not a “foreign occupation force of any form”. In other words, theoretically at least, the legality of deploying ground troops is about the intention and duration of their deployment, rather than an absolute bar against foreign troops at all. And this flexibility could be very useful, by, for example facilitating the deployment of liaison staff to the anti-Gaddafi forces – or even the deployment of Forward Air Controllers** to coordinate strike operations. 
In other words UNSCR 1973 is a massive step forward for R2P, giving a coalition of the willing in concert with regional groupings broad authority to protect civilians and to attack a repressive regime to do so. It should also leave the world’s remaining repressive autocracies with another early incentive to commence dialogue with whatever civil society groups they’ve failed to stamp out. One suspects that UNSCR 1973 is one precedent that they’ll be keen to forget in a hurry. Somehow I rather doubt that UNSCR 1973  will slide into obscurity so soon.
(Another F3 shot. Good!)

What is needed now is for the immediate implementation of UNSCR 1973 to save Benghazi and Tobruk, and then roll back the Gaddafi regime’s power. I only wish I was still involved*** to be able to play a small role in implementing one of the greatest humanitarian interventions in the postwar period – done successfully this will in time be seen in the same bracket as Kosovo, DR Kampuchea and East Pakistan.
And unlike these three, it will be explicitly legal.
*As an LSE graduate, I do hope that the School can find a route to strip Saif al-Islam of his LSE PhD. If he cheated, as is alleged, then so much the better.
** Or Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) or Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACs) or whatever the most recent Newspeak is for Forward Air Controllers.
*** As the sign outside 111(F) Sqn Hardened Aircraft Shelters at RAF Leuchars said words to this effect (for the next few weeks) “This Squadron is held at very high readiness to project fighter power worldwide. Are you ready?” Yes! F3s from Luqa, Malta fighting for Libyan liberty would be a fitting finale for the flick-knife of death. Salve, F3.

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

When is intervention not Intervention?


 (If invited, this is not the intervention force you're looking for.)

Regular readers of this blog* will know that I revere the UN Charter. And "revere" is not too strong a word, as international law has gained some of the status of a secular religion; indeed, like most religions the legal fraternity has its fair share of fundamentalists. But to stretch the biblical metaphor to breaking point, the UN Charter reflects its convoluted negotiation process, and like The Bible, the Charter has lots of internal tensions / contradictions. 

 (Blue book fundamentalism starts here)

The interplay between the Charter's Preamble on the Human Rights and Article 2(7)  on non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States illustrates these tensions perfectly. The Preamble talks of

"reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person in the equal rights of men and women"

and Article 2(7) says in part:

“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State … but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

There is clearly tension – when does protection of human rights trump non-intervention? If so, when and under what circumstances, and with what protections?

So how does this work in the real world?

 Pearl Square, Manama
(Note to editors: This has not been facilitated by a foreign non-intervening intervention.)

Bahrain

On Monday, 1000 Saudi soldiers togetherwith 150 armoured personnel carriers and 500 UAE policemen arrived in Bahrain, at the request of the Bahraini Government, as that Government believes it requires reinforcement to quell the pro-democracy movement that has blossomed in the "Arab spring". Combined with yesterday's declaration of a three-month State of Emergency, summarily suspending Bahrain’s human rights protections, Bahrain’s Government is effectively suppressing dissent with the force of foreign arms.

However, as this is at the request of the Government, the Government argues that this isn't intervention - instead it is (presumably) collective self-defence against external subversion. Interestingly, this is the same argument used by the Government of Republic of South Vietnam to legitimate the US-led coalition in what became the Vietnam War. As it isn't intervention, there is allegedly no violation of Article 2(7).

Libya

As you look at a map of the Middle East, move a few countries to the left on the other side of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and in Libya, Muamar Gaddafi is testing the other end of Article 2(7) by killing large numbers of Libyan civilians.

(The rather wonderful green book from the Very Important Book Box - VIBB)

So how much latitude should there be for Gaddafi to kill his own civilians? In the rather wonderful “Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary” edited by Bruno Simma (now Justice Simma of the International Court of Justice, ICJ), the stated law comes from the famous dictum in the Nicaragua Case from 1986:

“In view of the generally accepted formulations, the principle [of non-interference] forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters on which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy.”**

This is not very helpful – an intervention’s not allowed if it’s not allowed. But it is if it is. Hmm. Fortunately, in 1923, the ICJ’s predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice defined the distinction in Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco , noting to the effect that matters that are solely within the domestic jurisdiction or a State are such “matters which are not, in principle, regulated by international law… with respect to which States, therefore remained sole judge”***

Sounds sensible.

So if the controlling law is your international obligations, then Art 2(7) – the modern repository of the ancient law of non-intervention – ceases to cover Governments that are violating their international obligations. Specifically, this means that genocide – due to the 1948 Genocide Convention – and crimes against humanity**** – due to customary international law – cannot be wrapped in a cloak of Art 2(7) impunity. Indeed, this has been the case since the 1960s when aparthied South Africa consistently lost the argument that Art 2(7) meant that the UN has no locus to criticise the apartheid system.

(Victory, for some. Presumably a demonstration in favour of more billboards.)

This means that Gadaffi et al in Libya are not covered by Art 2(7). (Nor are the autocrats in Burma / Myanmar.)

But Bahrain? Democracy – pace Teson – is not protected by an international Treaty, so it is harder to argue that autocrats can’t phone a friend and borrow some troops to resist demands for the autocracy’s end. So the beach island holiday for the Saudi troops is probably legal, as long as they don’t actually engage in violence against Bahrain’s citizens. At this point, however, it would lose this legitimacy.

I realise that this is a slightly depressing result: it would be much more compelling to conclude that these are all things that need to be protected and that At 2(7) is outdated State-centric nonsense. But at least concluding that Art 2(7) is not a torturer’s charter is a start, and refining the concepts of R2P going forward will build upon it.

* There are at least some. And you know who you are.
** Nicaragua, ICJ Reports (1986), pp. 14, 107 para. 205.
*** PCIJ, Series B No. 4 (Feb 7, 1923), p. 24, in Simma  p. 157.
**** For these purposes, crimes against humanity are the same as war crimes committed against your own people.


Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Libya - a case for R2P?

(F3s finale over Libya? Sadly, probably not. Fuel-to-Noise. Go!)

There's been some talk about setting up a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya in the last few days. Whether this is a good idea militarily is a debate for others to have, but the legal position is clear enough: if the Security Council passes a Chapter VII resolution under Article 41 or Article 42, then it is legal to use force to enforce it.

If the Russians veto a draft resolution permitting an NFZ, then the questions around humanitarian intervention and R2P will resurface. As I blogged last week, there's a serious discussion to be had, but in my view there is an humanitarian exception and an NFZ is a decent way to start protecting the Libyan people from the depredations of the Gaddafi regime's death-throws. It is unlikely to be enough - Libya is vast and the number of aircraft that would be required to have standing patrols over all of the airfields under Gaddafi loyalist command, along with the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) support to ensure that surface to air missiles stayed on their launch rails, would be immense.

(More heroic F3 turning and burning into the sunset....)

But it would be a start.

Thursday, February 24, 2011

Am I my brother's keeper?


(No sign of Muammar. An oversight.)

Cain, Abel and Muammar Gaddafi are perhaps not the most obvious of bedfellows. But Cain's riposte to God after killing the mysterious and unexplained death of Abel (a matter that remains sub judice)* is as pertinent now as it was to biblical author: what responsibility do we carry singly and jointly for the well-being of our fellow human beings? Relatedly, how does this operate in a world in which Article 2(7) of the UN Charter restates the most ancient tenet of international law - non-interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state? In short, are we the keepers of our Libyan sisters and brothers as they face the threat of annihilation by their own government in a (final) spasm of murderous repression? 

Let's look at the notion of non-intervention, at the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the notion of an international "Responsibility to Protect", known as R2P in txtspk.

Non-Intervention - the international community's prime directive?
If non-intervention is a cardinal rule, then Cain is right and as long as it happens next door, it's no concern of mine: I am implacably not my brother's keeper.

Some countries argue that non-intervention is the cornerstone of the international system, and that this has been the case for centuries. This is, of course, palpably risible nonsense. Advocates of non-intervention generally mean that they are in favour of non-intervention in their affairs; it is therefore no surprise that the strongest and most persistent advocates of the non-interventionist mantra include PR China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Sudan and Zimbabwe, all of which have human rights records that they would wish to protect from outside scrutiny or interference. 

It is also important to note both that history is based around countries intervening in each others' internal affairs, and that intervention spans a much wider ambit than simply the use of force - sanctions, consumer boycotts, trade agreements reflect power realities and are used by stronger states to coerce weaker ones. Try asking an Irish or Greek politician about the amount of non-intervention that they’ve had to accept in their internal affairs in the form of a financial bailout – and no shots were fired. In other words, intervention in the internal affairs of other states is the norm, and the non-interventionist language in Article 2(7) is the aberration. 

 (Do we protect them? If not you, who? If not now, when?)

Humanitarian Intervention
Back in the early 1970s the International Law Association (ILA) created a framework for humanitarian intervention** which was picked up over the next decade led by Fernando Teson, an Argentine lawyer proposed along with some American lawyers a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. As a legal proposition, humanitarian intervention proposes an exception to the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity or massive human rights abuses where there is no option due to time or because the Security Council is deadlocked. 

All good. (Except that Teson and his proto-neo-conservative American chums decided that not being a democracy was a gross violation of human rights, and then used this to propound the deeply problematic notion of "pro-democratic wars"; Teson's supporters tended to find themselves on the hawkish/paranoid Republican right, some of whom went so far as to suggest a NATO invasion of central Europe to drive out the Soviet totalitarians. No prizes from your blogmaster for guessing the likely outcome of that particular policy choice if you'd tried to implement it.)

In one of those strange historical oddities,*** Teson's champions today are on the left, under the banner of solidarism. Nicholas Wheeler's "Saving Strangers" is the classic exposition of the need for a framework for where there should be an exception to the UN Charter rules on non-intervention and bars on the use of force. As Wheeler shows, the three classic Cold War interventions that could have been presented as humanitarian interventions (India in East Pakistan/Bangladeshi War of Independence, 1971; Tanzania in Uganda, 1978; Vietnam in Kampuchea, 1979) never claimed any humanitarian rationale at the time. Kosovo in 1999 is a partial example of humanitarian intervention, but some structural elements were not in accord with the ILA's 1974 blueprint. Similarly, UK/US/FR extending UNSCR 688 to (and arguably beyond) breaking point for Operation Provide Comfort with the Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones over Iraq.

(Op Northern Watch - aka heroic Jags over northern Iraq. Ahh....)

So under humanitarian intervention, you can present yourself as your sister's keeper, but you don't always get a chance to do anything about it - and if you do want to do something about it, then you need to make sure you work through the ILA check list, and crucially, you need to make explicit that it is a humanitarian intervention at the time that you do it. 

Bottom line: humanitarian intervention provides an optional route for States that want to intervene - if the world is indifferent, humanitarian intervention doctrine does not require the community of nations to do anything about massive human rights violations. Just ask Jim Hacker - he explains it far more eloquently than me; the Russians were indeed too strong...

Responsibility to Protect (R to P, R2P)
The 2005 UN World Summit outcomes document specifically recognised the need for a responsibility for collective action to stop "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" - which are all defined in the ICC Rome Statute. This is the genesis for Responsibility to Protect - a key turning point in international law. 

Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcomes states in part:

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 

Which is a real drafting hodgepodge, betraying the lack of unanimity in the international community. The answer appears to be that there is no unilateral right of intervention, the Security Council should do the right thing but there may be a regional organisation get out clause. Or not. 

So R2P is not clear yet: NGOs are pushing for clarity and for the world to move towards a Responsibility to Protect. Let's see how we're getting on. We need to speak clearly that the international community does have responsibilities and Libyan-style repression is a crime, pure and simple.




* This is a legal blog. You get legal jokes - bear with me, some of them are even funny.
**The ILA's Third Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the International Protection of Human Rights by General International Law, New Dehli, 1974

***For example the manner in which the British Conservatives have moved from being the principal supporters of British membership of the EEC to being dominated by anti-EU forces, whereas the British left moved from visceral anti-EEC agitation based on the notion that the EEC was an anti-worker capitalist plot to being broadly in favour of the EU as a method of promoting workers' interests.